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Managerial Power, Stock-Based Compensation,
and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence
Abstract
We study theoretically and empirically the relation among CEO power, CEO pay and
firm performance. Our theoretical model follows the rent extraction view of CEO com-
pensation put forward by the managerial power theory. We test our theoretical findings
using the sample of S&P1500 firms. The predicted relation between power and pay is
largely supported. However, the relation between power and firm performance has mixed
support, suggesting that, while the managerial power theory has relevance in explaining
the relation between power and pay, the scope of power needs to be broadened for better
understanding of how managerial power affects firm performance.
KEY WORDS: Managerial power, agency theory, stock-based incentives, firm perfor-
mance, pay-performance sensitivity.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D82, G32, J33.
1. Introduction
The compensation for corporations’ chief executive officers (CEOs) continues to attract
interests from academics, the business press as well as the general public. Of particular
interest in recent times has been the growth in the level of CEO compensation that
is beyond the increase in firm size or corporate earnings. For example, Bebchuk and
Grinstein (2005) report that, during the period of 1993-2003, the average total CEO
compensation for S&P500 firms increased by 166 percent, of which only 66 percent
is explained by an increase in firm size measured by sales and performance measured
by return on assets with the rest remaining unexplained.(1)(2) The growth in CEO
pay, against the backdrop of corporate scandals and governance failures that plagued
corporations around the world, has put executive compensation in the center of the
debate on corporate governance.
Among the many issues that relate to executive compensation is a debate on whether
the leading paradigm of agency theory is adequate in explaining the observed practice
of executive pay. In the standard agency theory, executive compensation is viewed
as a solution to shareholders’ optimal contracting problem: the contract is designed
by shareholders or their representatives to maximize shareholder value subject to the
CEO’s incentive and participation constraints. In a series of articles and an influential
book, Bebchuk and his co-authors (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003,
2004) challenge this view. Their main thesis is that observed practice of executive pay
is explained better by the managerial power theory whereby CEOs effectively set their
own pay by influencing the pay-setting process.(3) Bebchuk and Fried (2004) provide
ample evidence in support of this view. The interest in the managerial power theory
(1) According to Forbes (“Big paychecks”, March 5, 2007), the collective total CEO pay for the largest
500 firms in the US increased by 38 percent during 2005-2006. During the same period, the S&P500
index rose by 15.79 percent. Numerous articles in the media report high-profile cases of ‘excessive’ CEO
pay despite mediocre firm performance. For example, see The Economist (November 24, 2005), “Too
many turkeys”; The Economist (January 18, 2007), “Power pay”; Fortune (June 30, 2006), “The real
CEO pay problem”; The New York Times (January 4, 2007), “An ousted chief’s going-away pay is seen
by many as typically excessive”.
(2) An alternative explanation for the growth of CEO pay is offered in a recent study by Gabaix and
Landier (2008). Based on the data on CEO pay in the US between 1980 and 2003, they find that the
the six-fold increase in CEO pay during the period can be attributed to the six-fold increase in market
value of firms.
(3) The managerial power theory, broadly defined, can be traced back at least to Berle and Means
(1932, pp 80-82). They describe the mechanism whereby the management, even with negligible share
ownership, can assume effective control of the firm through the appointment of the proxy committee,
which they dub management control. It is also found, although without formalization, in the more recent
management literature. For example, Finkelstein (1992) describes various dimensions of managerial
power. The ability to affect one’s own pay is one dimension of managerial power, closely related to
what Finkelstein called structural power, which is also the definition of power adopted by Lambert et
al. (1993). How managerial power influences CEO pay has been the subject of many studies from legal,
organizational and sociological perspectives, as Bebchuk and Fried (2004) acknowledge.
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and the controversies surrounding CEO power and pay can be witnessed by a host of
the critiques of, and the support for Bebchuk and Fried’s book.(4)
The central implication of the managerial power approach is simple. Rather than a
solution to shareholders’ optimal contracting problem, executive compensation is viewed
as a mechanism through which powerful, entrenched CEOs extract rent from sharehold-
ers. As a consequence, the more powerful CEOs are, the more pay they award them-
selves with less strings attached. In doing so, the only constraint CEOs face is what
Bebchuk and Fried called the ‘outrage constraint’, which curbs pay that is considered
too excessive.(5) If one takes the implication of the managerial power theory literally,
then the corollaries are that the total CEO pay should increase in managerial power,
pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation should decrease in managerial power
and, consequently, managerial power should lead to worse firm performance. While the
first corollary seems hardly disputable, the other two are not entirely clear. If more
power renders the CEO more room for rent extraction, then it would be rational for
the CEO to try to maximize firm value, which he can extract through channels that
are incentive-neutral. In other words, one needs to be more clear about how managerial
power affects the structure of CEO compensation and how it affects firm performance
in turn. For example, what is the mechanism whereby managerial power is used for rent
extraction? Does managerial power lead to larger stock-based compensation for CEOs
and, if so, does this destroy firm value? Or is the ‘excessive pay’ purely a distributional
issue?
This paper has two main objectives. First, we provide a simple, theoretical analysis
of how managerial power affects CEO compensation and firm performance. To focus on
the main thesis of the managerial power theory, we restrict our attention to one aspect of
power, namely the CEO’s power to influence his own pay. Specifically we ask two related
questions. If the manager has the power to design his own compensation contract, how
is the resulting contract different from the one that is designed by the board in an arm’s
length way? And does this increase agency costs and lead to poorer firm performance?
Second, we provide empirical analyses of our theoretical findings in a unified framework
using a comprehensive data set encompassing CEO power, CEO pay, and firm perfor-
mance. The working hypothesis in the majority of existing empirical studies is that more
(4) Various academic responses, critical as well as supportive, are listed on http://www.pay-without-
performance.com. Weisbach (2007) offers a more ‘balanced’ review of the book.
(5) AsWeisbach (2007) points out, the weakness of the managerial power approach is that the ‘outrage’
constraint is not well-specified. One possible interpretation is that the constraint imposes some upper
bound either on the size of total CEO pay or on the element of pay that is highly visible to public, such
as cash salary and bonus. In this paper, we take the second interpretation as it is also more in line with
what Bebchuk and Fried called the ‘camouflage’ aspect of CEO compensation.
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CEO power leads to higher CEO pay, which in turn leads to poorer firm performance.
We contend that this link from CEO power to firm performance needs to be examined
more carefully. In particular, one needs to be clear about whether performance is mea-
sured in gross terms or in net terms, the latter accounting for the dilution effects of
the CEO’s stock-based compensation.(6) When performance is measured in gross terms,
more CEO power can lead to better firm performance, although it can lead to poorer
performance in net terms. This distinction is not made explicit in the existing literature.
Our theoretical analysis is based on a simple principal-agent model in which a firm
consists of a representative shareholder, or the board, and a risk- and work-averse man-
ager. The manager’s private effort randomly affects the firm’s stock price, which is the
only performance signal available. As for the form of managerial contract, we focus on
the contract that is linear in stock price. The managerial contract is determined through
bargaining between the board and the manager. In one polar case where the board has
full bargaining power, the board designs a compensation contract for the manager to
maximize the shareholder’s residual return subject to the manager’s incentive compat-
ibility, individual rationality, and limited liability constraints. In the other polar case
where the manager has full bargaining power, the manager designs his own compensa-
tion contract to maximize his expected utility subject to the shareholder’s individual
rationality constraint, his own limited liability and incentive compatibility constraints.
The solution to a general bargaining problem lies between the above two polar cases,
varying continuously in some proxy of the manager’s bargaining power.
We show that the optimal contracts in the two polar cases have the same size of
stock-based compensation for the manager, providing the manager with the same effort
incentives and, consequently, resulting in the same firm performance gross of manage-
rial compensation. The intuition is simple. When the manager designs a compensation
contract for himself, he would do so to motivate himself to exert a (second-best) effi-
cient level of effort that would maximize the gross expected return less the cost of his
effort. He can then extract the entire surplus from the shareholder through a lump-
sum base salary for himself, making the shareholder’s individual rationality constraint
binding in the process. If the board designs the managerial contract, it would again
motivate the manager to exert the efficient level of effort, although the manager in this
case would not enjoy the entire surplus. Therefore whoever designs the contract faces
the same optimization problem except for a lump-sum wealth transfer that does not
(6) The distinction between gross and net performance measures is discussed formally in Section 4.
Oft-used measures such as Tobin’s Q and ROA are both gross measures, while total shareholder return
used by Jensen and Murphy (1990b) is a net measure.
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have any incentive effect.(7) In short, managerial power does not lead to a distortion
in efficiency, but only results in wealth transfer from the shareholder to the manager.
Managerial power in this case is thus efficiency-neutral. This generates several testable
hypotheses. In firms where the manager’s base salary is positive and unconstrained, (i)
the size of the manager’s stock-based compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity
of management compensation are independent of managerial power, (ii) the size of the
manager’s salary increases in managerial power, (iii) firm performance gross of the man-
ager’s compensation is independent of managerial power, and (iv) firm performance net
of the manager’s compensation decreases in managerial power.
The above result is valid as long as the manager can set his own salary without
any constraint. In this case, the manager’s salary is used as a vehicle through which
the manager extracts rent from the shareholder without distorting his own incentives.
However, the case of unconstrained salary may be unrealistic at least for three reasons.
First, firm size may limit the amount of salary that can be paid. It is both unrealistic
and infeasible for small firms to match salaries paid by their larger counterparts. Indeed
in our sample of S&P1500 firms, small and medium size firms pay much lower salaries
than S&P500 firms. Second, cash salary is highly visible to shareholders and other
investors. Too high a salary level could be viewed excessive and backfire by breaking what
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) called the outrage constraint. Third, in the US, the Internal
Revenue Code Section 162(m) that became effective in 1994 limited the tax deductibility
of executive compensation in excess of one million dollars, unless the compensation was
performance-related.(8) Of the various components of executive compensation, salary is
the most prominent part that is not performance-related.(9) Empirical evidence suggests
that a large number of firms respect the so-called million dollar rule (e.g., Hall and
Liebman, 2000; Perry and Zenner, 2001; Rose and Wolfram, 2002; Graham and Wu,
2007). Our data also show that, in two thirds of S&P500 firms during 2001-2005, the
salary for CEOs was less than $1 million. Given that the non-tax deductibility of salary
(7) This is a direct consequence of duality.
(8) The rule is applicable to the CEO and four highest paid top executives of the company other
than the CEO. The $1 million cap applies to all forms of compensation if a firm has an insider on its
compensation committee.
(9) The rule may also apply to other forms of compensation such as restricted stock, discretionary
bonus, perks, etc. According to an IRS private ruling (PLR 121582-04), however, restricted stock should
most likely be treated as performance-related compensation, thus not subject to the $1 million limit of
tax deduction. Bonuses should also sometimes be treated as performance-related compensation, thus
not subject to the million dollar rule. Even if some portion of bonus may not be treated as performance-
related, it is not possible to separate various types of bonuses from the data. Other compensation items,
such as perks or insurance, though not performance-related, should not be a substantial component of
CEO pay. Over our sample period of 2001-2005, salary + bonus + options + restricted stock together
account for about 92% of CEO total compensation on average.
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above $1 million represents only small costs for large firms paying their CEOs salary
above $1 million,(10) the clustering of firms around $1 million needs more plausible
explanation than just the tax consideration. One possible explanation put forward by
Rose and Wolfram (2002) is that the million dollar rule may have created a focal point for
salary compensation, enabling firms to coordinate on the ‘non-excessive’ level of salary,
given the shareholders’ outrage constraint.
Motivated by the above discussions, we look at the next case where there is an
upper bound on the manager’s salary.(11) In those firms with effective salary ceiling,
the manager’s ability to extract rent through salary is limited. Thus the manager uses
stock-based compensation as an additional channel for rent extraction. As a conse-
quence, the manager awards himself more stock-based compensation than when there
is no salary ceiling. Therefore, in firms with effective salary ceiling, the size of the
manager’s stock-based compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial
contract both increase in managerial power. Interestingly, managerial power in this case
improves firm performance gross of the manager’s pay simply because the manager’s
stock-based compensation increases in managerial power, which in turn increases the
manager’s effort incentives. However the return to outside shareholders decreases be-
cause the salary ceiling induces the powerful manager to ‘over-incentivize’ himself with
stock-based compensation, leading to the dilution of firm value for outside shareholders.
Our theoretical findings suggest that care should be taken in empirical studies that
relate managerial power to firm performance, whether performance is measured based
on accounting profits or stock price. In particular, one needs to distinguish between
gross and net performance measures in regards to the extent to which shareholder value
has been diluted by stock-based compensation awarded to executives but not yet vested.
For example, consider return on assets, which is often used to measure firm performance
based on accounting profits. Since executive stock options are not typically expensed
against corporate earnings under the US accounting practice, such an accounting measure
tends to overstate true corporate performance.(12) Evidence suggests that market-based
(10) In about one third of our sample of S&P500 firms, the CEO’s salary was above $1 million with
median salary at $1.235 million, implying the tax cost of only $70,000 at the 30% corporate tax rate.
(11) Of course the million dollar rule does not literally imply there is a cap on salary; it only implies
a non-linear change in the cost of executive salary to the firm, which can be incorporated by a minor
extension of our analysis in Section 3. As discussed above, we abstract away the tax consideration and
posit that some firms believe they face an effective constraint on CEOs’ salary. This is also the approach
we take in our empirical analyses: we divide our sample of firms to two groups, those with CEO salary
above $1 million and those with CEO salary below $1 million.
(12) The U.S. Federal Reserve Board estimates that such accounting practice has led to the overstate-
ment of corporate profits by an average of 2.5% a year over the past 5 years (The Economist, A survey
of international finance, May 14-28, 2002). It should be noted, however, that a majority of companies
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performance measures are not free from such an overstatement either. Although ef-
ficient markets should impound such a favorable accounting treatment of stock-based
compensation into stock price, Garvey and Milbourn (2002) show that stock markets
tend to undervalue the costs of stock-based compensation until they are realized. In our
empirical analyses, we take this distinction into account.
Before closing the introductory section, we stress that our theoretical model is fo-
cused only on one aspect of managerial power, namely, the power to influence one’s own
pay. As has been pointed out by many (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992; Pfeffer, 1992; Adams
et al., 2005), managerial power has diverse dimensions. In our theoretical model, we
abstract away other aspects of managerial power, not because they are not relevant but
because our main objective is to understand more rigorously the central implications
of the managerial power theory. Defining power in this way leads to clear theoretical
predictions regarding the relation between power, pay and firm performance. On the
other hand, not all of these theoretical predictions are supported by our empirical find-
ings. Although the predicted relation between power and pay is largely supported by
our empirical findings, the relation between power and firm performance as predicted
by theory has mixed support. This suggests that, while the managerial power theory
has clear relevance in explaining the relation between power and pay, the scope of power
needs to be broadened to have better understanding of how managerial power affects
firm performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant empir-
ical studies. Section 3 describes the basic theoretical model and solves for the optimal
contracts. Section 4 develops testable hypotheses based on the results from Section 3,
and describes variables and models used for empirical analyses. Section 5 contains the
description of data used in this study and offers preliminary descriptive statistics while
Section 6 reports our empirical findings. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related Empirical Studies
There is a vast literature that empirically examines the relation among CEO power,
CEO pay and firm performance. The central hypothesis tested in most of these studies
is that more CEO power leads to higher CEO pay, which in turn leads to poorer firm
performance. The first part of the hypothesis is hardly disputable although what is
in our sample start adopting the fair-value method in reporting expenses of stock options from 2004.
The adjusted earnings figure, or the Compustat variable OPTFVGR, should be close to our net perfor-
mance measure while the conventional ROA can be considered as a gross performance measure. This is
discussed more in Section 4.2.4.
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more important in our view is how CEO power affects the structure of CEO pay since,
as Jensen and Murphy (1990a) put it aptly, ‘it’s not how much you pay, but how’.
This also has important bearings upon the the second part of the hypothesis, depending
largely on how firm performance is measured. To put the contribution of our paper in
perspectives, we divide existing studies into two groups: those that focus on the relation
between CEO power and CEO pay; and those that focus on the relation between CEO
power and firm performance. The relation between CEO pay and firm performance can
be inferred from these two.
Although the variables used to measure firm performance and CEO pay are quite
standard, there is a long list of proxies used to measure CEO power. We first describe
these variables before reviewing the empirical literature. Firm performance is usually
measured by total shareholder return (TSR), Tobin’s Q, or return on assets (ROA) while
CEO pay is measured by salary, cash compensation (salary + bonus), or total compen-
sation, the latter including the dollar value of the CEO’s stock-based compensation.
Most empirical studies proxy CEO power along three dimensions: board characteristics,
shareholder rights and ownership structure. As for board characteristics, the following
five variables, or a combination of them, are used: (1) size of the board, (2) how busy an
average outside director is, (3) number of executive directors on the board, (4) whether
the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and (5) executive representation on nomina-
tion or compensation committees, with implied CEO power increasing in each of these
five variables. Another measure of CEO power is based on some indices of the firm’s
corporate governance and shareholder rights such as the GIM index due to Gompers,
Ishii and Metrick (2003), and the BCF entrenchment index due to Bebchuk, Cohen and
Ferrell (2009), with a poorer governance score of either measure associated with larger
CEO power. The third measure of CEO power is based on the CEO’s share ownership
and the existence of large outside shareholders, the latter implying smaller CEO power.
2.1. CEO power and CEO pay
The studies on the relation between CEO power and CEO pay generally report that
the level of CEO pay is higher when the CEO is more powerful whether CEO pay is in
terms of salary, cash, or total compensation. However, the relation between CEO power
and the structure of CEO compensation contract, the size of stock-based compensation
in particular, is less clear.
The positive relation between CEO pay and CEO power in relation to boards is
reported in Core et al. (1999) when CEO power is measured by all five board character-
istics discussed above, and in Newman and Mozes (1999) when at least one insider sits on
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the compensation committee. The positive influence of CEO power in relation to boards
extends to other components of CEO compensation such as golden parachutes. Wade et
al. (1990) find that the CEO is more likely to secure a golden parachute as the percentage
of outside board members appointed after the CEO takes office increases. Such a link
between power and pay is shown to be robust for other measures of CEO power such as
the CEO’s share ownership (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988), the presence of institutional
investors (Hartzell and Starks, 2003), and the presence of large blockholders (Benz et
al., 2001; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Core et al., 1999).
As for the relation between CEO power and the CEO’s stock-based compensation,
the empirical evidence is mixed. In the first set of studies, less CEO power leads to
more incentive-based compensation for the CEO. Harzell and Starks (2003) find that
the presence of large institutional investors results in more performance-sensitive com-
pensation for the CEO, implying that institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating
the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Conyon and He (2004) find
that the CEO’s equity compensation is larger if equity ownership of the members on
the compensation committee is larger, the latter being interpreted to imply less CEO
power. Newman and Mozes (1999) also report that the sensitivity of the CEO’s pay to
performance is lower when at least one insider sits on the compensation committee.
The second set of studies report the opposite findings. Cyert et al. (2002) use
the 1992-1993 data from large US firms to show that the CEO’s equity compensation
is negatively related to equity ownership of the largest external shareholder, and equity
ownership of the members on the compensation committee. The interpretation by Cyert
et al. is that the CEO’s equity-based compensation is seen as the sign of CEO power:
more powerful CEOs enjoy the profligacy of awarding themselves more equity-based
compensation since the dilution effect outweighs incentive effects. Benz et al. (2001)
report similar findings in relation to stock option awards to top executives. This is
largely consistent with Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005), who show that total compensa-
tion for CEOs in large US firms has risen considerably during the period of 1993-2003,
with much of the increase due to an increase in equity-based compensation, without a
reduction in cash compensation. One explanation offered by Bebchuk and Fried (2004,
Chapter 5) is that the increase in equity-based pay is a consequence of managerial power:
outsiders’ enthusiasm for incentive-based compensation provided executives and direc-
tors with opportunities to raise pay levels substantially in ways that appear acceptable
to outsiders.
2.2. CEO power and firm performance
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The studies on the relation between CEO power and firm performance report that
the expected negative relation between the two is significant for some measures of CEO
power, but not so for others.
As for board characteristics, majority of studies find that firm performance is pos-
itively related to smaller boards (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberga et al., 1998; Conyon and
Peck, 1998) and boards with less busy outside directors (Core et al., 1999; Fich and
Shivdasani, 2006). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also argue that “the norm of behaviors
in most boardrooms are dysfunctional” as directors often do not criticize the policies
of executives, and this problem increases with size of the board. However, Coles et al.
(2008) challenge the notion that restrictions on board size and management represen-
tation on the board necessarily enhance firm value. They find that complex firms have
larger boards with more outside directors, compared to simpler firms, and that Tobin’s
Q increases in board size for complex firms but decreases in board size for simple firms,
and such relation is driven by the number of outside directors.
Evidence on the relation between performance and the other three board variables
is mixed. As for the number of outside directors on the board, which may be taken
as a measure of board independence, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Yermack (1996),
Bhagat and Black (2002) find no association between the percentage of outside directors
and firm performance while Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Core et al. (1999) report
a negative effect of a large fraction of outside directors on firm performance. Moreover,
based on a system of simultaneous equations that takes into account endogeneity and
causation issues, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) report that board independence is negatively
and significantly related to contemporaneous and future operating performance. On the
other hand, Borokhovich et al. (1996) find that board independence can add firm value
while Helland and Sykuta (2005) find a negative relation between the proportion of
outside directors and the probability a firm will be sued by shareholders, suggesting
that boards with higher proportions of outside directors do a better job in monitoring
management.
In regards to the relation between firm performance and the duality of CEO as
board chairman, Brickley et al. (1997) argue that the separation of CEO and board
chairman has potential costs as well as potential benefits. Their evidence suggests that
the costs are larger than the benefits for most large firms. However, Core et al. (1999)
and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) report a negative relation between such duality and firm
performance while Adams et al. (2005) find no significant relation between the two.
Finally, Klein (1998) finds no significant relation between the composition of board
audit committee and firm performance, and between the composition of board com-
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pensation committee and firm performance, although Larcker et al. (2005) report that
CEO’s closeness to members of the compensation committee is shown to increase CEO
compensation, suggesting an indirect negative impact on firm performance. On the other
hand, Callahan et al. (2003) find a positive relation between management participation
in the director selection process and corporate performance.
A growing number of studies have created alternative index measures of corporate
governance, and examined whether these measures have a systematic relation with firm
performance. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003; GIM henceforth) construct an index of
corporate governance, based on 24 provisions measuring shareholder rights. They report
that stock returns for firms with strong shareholder rights (low governance index score)
outperform returns for firms with weak shareholder rights. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell
(2009) created an ‘entrenchment index’ based on 6 out of the 24 GIM provisions, arguing
this subset leads to a sharper negative relation between poor governance and lower firm
valuation. As another governance index, Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2007) measure
CEO power as the percentage of aggregate top-five executives’ total compensation cap-
tured by the CEO, which they called CEO centrality. They show that CEO centrality
is negatively related to firm performance. Brown and Caylor (2004) created another
index, Gov-Score, based on 52 governance factors encompassing eight categories such
as executive and director compensation, corporate charter/bylaws, and board structure
and processes. Their evidence supports the notion that better-governed firms are rela-
tively more profitable, more valuable, and have higher shareholder returns than poorly
governed firms. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) report that better governance as measured by
the GIM-index, among others, is significantly positively correlated with better contem-
poraneous and subsequent operating performance but not correlated with future stock
market performance measures.
As for the relation between the firm’s ownership structure and performance, Dem-
setz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the ownership structure - whether
concentrated or diffused - is an endogenous outcome optimally chosen to maximize firm
value, which leads to a two-way causality and endogneity problem between the owner-
ship structure and firm performance. Not surprisingly, evidence on the relation between
insider ownership and firm performance is also mixed. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) and
Singh and Davidson (2003) report evidence in support of Jensen and Meckling (1976)
and Jensen and Murphy (1990b) that increased insider ownership lowers agency costs
while Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villa-
longa (2001) find no significant relation between insider ownership and firm value after
controlling for endogeneity of ownership. Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Ser-
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vaes (1990) report that insider ownership influences firm value in an inverse U-shaped
fashion. As for the influence of outside ownership, especially that of institutional share-
holders, Pound (1988) argues that institutional investors may affect firm value either
positively (effective monitor) or negatively (conspirer with management). Clay (2000)
and Mehran (1995) find evidence supporting the positive effect of institutional ownership
on firm value. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find a positive relation between institutional
ownership concentration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of a firm’s executive
compensation, implying an indirect positive relation between institutional ownership
and firm performance.
3. A Bargaining Model of Managerial Contract
The structure and level of the CEO’s compensation contract can depend on a variety of
factors such as the CEO’s talent and the demand-supply interactions in the CEO labor
market (Gabaix and Landier, 2008), as well as the extent to which the CEO can influence
the process whereby his compensation contract is determined. The gist of managerial
power theory is that the CEO’s influence on the pay-setting process can lead to the
CEO’s compensation contract that favors the CEO at the cost to outside shareholders.
To focus on this, we present a simple bargaining model in which the owner and the
manager bargain over the manager’s compensation contract.
Consider a firm consisting of an owner, or the representative shareholder, and a
manager.(13) The manager is risk averse whose preferences are represented by a CARA
utility function u(x, e) = −exp[−r(x − c(e))], where r is the coefficient of constant
absolute risk aversion, x is his monetary payoff, and c(e) is the monetary cost when he
exerts effort e. The effort cost function satisfies c′(e) > 0 and c′′(e) > 0. The manager’s
reservation utility is denoted by U¯ . To simplify notation, we assume that the owner is
risk neutral. All our qualitative results can be shown to hold even when the owner is
risk averse. The owner’s reservation utility is denoted by V¯ .
The firm’s stock price (gross of managerial compensation) follows a random process
y = y¯(e)+ , where the error term  has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
σ(e). We assume that y¯′(e) > 0, y¯′′(e) ≤ 0, σ′(e) ≤ 0 and σ′′(e) ≥ 0. That is, managerial
effort increases the mean and weakly reduces the variance of stock price but the marginal
effects are diminishing.(14) Note that y¯′(e) > 0 implies the usual monotone likelihood
(13) We will use the female gender pronoun for the owner and the male gender pronoun for the manager.
(14) That managerial effort also affects the variance of stock price is for the sake of generality, and the
assumed signs of derivatives are to ensure that the second-order conditions hold. All our results hold if
σ′(e) = 0.
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ratio condition. We focus on linear contracts in designing an optimal incentive scheme for
the manager, which has a natural interpretation of salary plus stock-based compensation.
However our results can be shown to hold for general contractual forms if the manager has
mean-variance preferences. Since managerial compensation given any linear contract also
has a normal distribution, we can express his expected utility from any linear contract
as its certainty equivalent.
In determining the optimal managerial contract,(15) we consider a bargaining game
between the owner and the manager. One can think of either a generalized Nash bar-
gaining game or a noncooperative Rubinstein bargaining game. The bargaining game
proceeds given the two reference points, one based on agency theory and the other based
on managerial power theory. If the owner has all the bargaining power making a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the manager as is typically assumed in agency theory, the resulting
contract is the one that maximizes the owner’s expected utility subject to the manager’s
individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. If the manager has all
the bargaining power in contract design, then the resulting outcome is the contract that
maximizes the manager’s expected utility subject to the owner’s individual rationality
constraint and the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint.(16) These two outcomes
serve as the reference points for the bargaining game. Then it is well known that the
generalized Nash bargaining solution is a weighted average of the two outcomes with
the weights depending on the players’ bargaining power, which is also approximated by
the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a Rubinstein bargaining game where the bargaining
power is inversely related to individual discount rate. Thus, as the manager’s (owner’s,
resp.) bargaining power increases, the solution converges to the one designed by the
manager (owner, resp.).(17) In what follows we first solve for the two reference point
contracts.
3.1. Optimal contract when the owner has full bargaining power
Let the manager’s compensation contract be given by ω(y) = αy+β, where α ∈ [0, 1]
is the incentive component, or the manager’s share of the firm, and β is the base salary.
(15) The term ‘optimal’ does not imply the usual second-best efficient contract for the owner. It refers
to a contract that is optimal from the viewpoint of the contract designer. If the owner designs the
contract for the manager, then the optimal contract is the one that minimizes agency costs as in Jensen
and Meckling (1976). If the manager designs the contract for himself, then the optimal contract is the
one that maximizes his utility subject to the relevant constraints.
(16) The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint is necessary; otherwise, the contract cannot
credibly satisfy the owner’s individual rationality constraint.
(17) For example, see Binmore (1992), Chapter 5.
12
Then the manager’s expected utility can be written as
U(α, β, e) ≡ αy¯(e) + β − c(e)− 0.5rα2σ(e) (1)
while the owner’s expected utility is
V (α, β, e) ≡ (1− α)y¯(e)− β. (2)
The managerial contract needs to satisfy the manager’s incentive compatibility (IC),
individual rationality (IR), and limited liability (LL) constraints. Thus the optimal
contracting problem for the owner is
Maximizeα,β,e V (α, β, e) subject to
(IC): e maximizes U(α, β, ·), (IR): U(α, β, e) ≥ U¯ , (LL): (α, β) ≥ 0. (3)
We start by analyzing (IC). Given (α, β), the first-order condition for the optimal
effort is determined by
αy¯′(e)− c′(e)− 0.5rα2σ′(e) = 0. (4)
Our assumptions ensure that there is a unique solution to (4) so that we can define the
optimal effort as a function of α, which is denoted by e(α). Clearly e is independent
of β. Moreover, e is an increasing function of α: totally differentiating (4) leads us to
de
dα = − y¯
′−rασ′
αy¯′′−c′′−0.5rα2σ′′ > 0. Next, note that, in any optimal contract, α should be
smaller than 1. Otherwise, the owner’s expected utility will be negative. Also α should
be larger than 0. If α = 0, then the only way to ensure the manager’s (IR) is to make
β positive. Since β does not affect the manager’s effort, it is in the owner’s interest to
increase α while reducing β, if she wishes to induce any effort from the manager. This
will be optimal for the owner unless the manager’s cost of effort is too large. Thus we
assume that the optimal α is in the interior.
To characterize the solution to (3), note first that either (IR) or (LL) should be
binding in any optimal contract. If none of them is binding, then the owner can reduce
β further until either (IR) or (LL) binds. This will increase V without changing e. This
leaves us three possible cases to consider: (Case 1) U(α, β, e) > U¯ , β = 0; (Case 2)
U(α, β, e) = U¯ , β > 0; (Case 3) U(α, β, e) = U¯ , β = 0. Since the case of zero salary
is unrealistic, however, we only consider (Case 2).(18) In this case, the manager’s (IR)
is binding: U(α, β, e) = U¯ . Solving this for β and substituting it into V (α, β, e), we
(18) Analyses of the remaining cases are straightforward and omitted here.
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have V (α, e(α)) = y¯(e(α))− 0.5rα2σ(e(α))− c(e(α))− U¯ . The first-order condition for
maximizing V (α, e(α)) with respect to α is[
y¯′(e(α))− 0.5rα2σ′(e(α))− c′(e(α))]e′(α)− rασ(e(α)) = 0. (5)
Denote the solution to (5) by αa. Then the base salary is given by βa ≡ U¯ − αay¯(ea) +
c(ea)+ 0.5rα2aσ(ea) where ea ≡ e(αa). This is the case much analyzed in the literature.
For example, if y¯′(e) = 1 and σ′(e) = 0, then we are led to a familiar expression,
αa = 11+rσc′′ (e.g., Murphy, 1999).
3.2. Optimal contract when the manager has full bargaining power
Denote the manager’s contract by w(y) = ay + b. Then the optimal contracting
problem in this case is to maximize the manager’s expected utility subject to the owner’s
(IR): V (a, b, e) ≥ V¯ , and the same (IC) and (LL) for the manager as before. Given
w(y) = ay+b, the manager’s (IC) is the same as (4) with (α, β) replaced by (a, b). Thus
we have the same effort function e(·) as before. Clearly, the manager’s effort choice is
again independent of the base salary b. Therefore the manager will set b as large as
possible. This will make the owner’s (IR) binding at any optimal contract designed by
the manager. That is, the optimal contract designed by the manager will not leave any
rent to the owner and the owner receives exactly the market rate of return on her capital.
Then the manager’s optimal contracting problem can be written as
Maximizea,b U(a, b, e(a)) subject to V (a, b, e(a)) = V¯ . (6)
Solving V (a, b, e(a)) = V¯ for b and substituting it into U(a, b, e(a)) leads to U(a, e(a))
= y¯(e(a)) − 0.5ra2σ(e(a)) − c(e(a)) − V¯ . Maximizing this with respect to a leads to
the same first-order condition as (5) with α replaced by a:[
y¯′(e(a))− 0.5ra2σ′(e(a))− c′(e(a))]e′(a)− raσ(e(a)) = 0. (7)
Denote the solution to (7) by αp. Then the solution to the manager’s optimal
contracting problem is (αp, βp, ep) where ep = e(αp) and βp = (1− αp)y¯(ep)− V¯ .
3.3. Comparison of the optimal contracts and bargaining
We now compare the optimal contracts in the two cases. We start by noting that
the manager’s (IC) is the same in both contracts. This implies that managerial power
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does not lead to an additional efficiency loss if the manager’s optimal share of the firm
is the same regardless of who designs the contract. In the owner-designed contract, the
manager’s optimal share of the firm is αa determined from (5). In the manager-designed
contract, the manager’s optimal share of the firm is αp determined from (7). Since (5)
is the same as (7), we must have αa = αp, from which follows ea = ep.
Proposition 1: If the manager receives a positive base salary in the owner-designed
contract, then the manager’s optimal share of the firm is the same regardless of who
designs the managerial contract. As a result, the manager exerts the same level of effort
in both contracts.
An implication of the above proposition is that allocation of power in contract
design is irrelevant as long as efficiency is concerned. Shifting power from the owner
to the manager changes only the distribution of rent in favor of the manager, without
having any impact on the manager’s effort. The intuition is simple. Given the power
to design a contract for himself, the manager would not distort efficiency, but rather
try to maximize the size of the pie, which he can fully extract from the owner through
the vehicle that does not distort his own incentives. The vehicle for rent extraction is
the base salary if the level of salary can be chosen without any upper bound. As long
as there is no cap on the base salary, managerial power is reflected in the size of the
manager’s salary, rather than the incentive component of managerial compensation.
To see how managerial power affects firm performance, let us consider a bargaining
game where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a proxy for the manager’s bargaining power. The generalized
Nash bargaining problem can be written as
Maximizeα,β [U(α, β, e(α))− U¯ ]γ [V (α, β, e(α))− V¯ ]1−γ
subject to U(α, β, e(α)) ≥ U¯ , V (α, β, e(α)) ≥ V¯ (8)
where the manager’s (IC) has been incorporated in e(α). If γ = 1, then the solution
to (8) is (αp, βp) and, if γ = 0, then the solution is (αa, βa). The general solution
to (8) is given by (αγ , βγ) ≡ γ(αp, βp) + (1 − γ)(αa, βa). Given this the manager’s
effort level is determined as eγ = e(αγ). Define now gross firm performance as the
expected stock price, y¯(eγ), and net firm performance as the expected return to the
owner, V (γ) ≡ (1 − αγ)y¯(eγ) − βγ . Then it is immediate that gross firm performance
and the manager’s stock-based compensation are both independent of managerial power
since, from Proposition 1, both αγ = αp = αa and eγ = e(αγ) are independent of
γ. However, net firm performance decreases in managerial power since βγ increases
continuously in γ.
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An additional implication of the above proposition is related to the pay-performance
sensitivity of managerial contract: an increase in the manager’s pay in response to an
increase in shareholder value. In our model it is reflected in the manager’s optimal
share of the firm, αγ . Since it is independent of managerial power, the pay-performance
sensitivity is observationally equivalent whether the firm’s governance fits agency theory
or managerial power theory. Summarizing these discussions, we obtain the following
hypotheses.
Corollary 2: In firms where the manager’s base salary is positive and unconstrained, (i)
both the size of the manager’s stock-based compensation and the pay-performance sen-
sitivity of management compensation are independent of managerial power, (ii) the size
of the manager’s salary increases in managerial power, (iii) firm performance gross of the
manager’s compensation is independent of managerial power, and (iv) firm performance
net of the manager’s compensation decreases in managerial power.
3.4. Optimal contracts with salary constraint
So far we have assumed that there is no upper bound on the manager’s base salary.
This enabled the powerful manager to extract rent through the base salary without dis-
torting his own incentives. However, the case of unconstrained salary may be unrealistic
for reasons discussed in the introduction. In this section we consider the case where
there is a ceiling on the manager’s base salary, denoted by β¯. Since the manager’s salary
is larger under the manager-designed contract, a meaningful case is where the salary
constraint is binding only under the manager-designed contract. That is, we look at
the case where βp > β¯ > βa. This is the only additional constraint to the manager’s
optimal contracting problem in (6). The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint
remains the same, leading to the same optimal effort function e(α) as before. Thus the
manager’s optimal contracting problem can be written as
Maximizea,b U(a, b, e(a)) subject to V (a, b, e(a)) ≥ V¯ and b ≤ β¯. (9)
In this section we maintain the following assumption, which states that the man-
ager’s expected utility increases if he is given a larger share of the firm for free.
Assumption 1: ∂U(α,β,e)∂α = y¯(e)− rασ(e) > 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1] and e.
Denote the solution to problem (9) by (αc, βc, ec) where ec = e(αc). The following
lemma shows that both constraints are binding at the solution to (9).
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Lemma 3: At the solution to (9), βc = β¯ and V (αc, βc, ec) = V¯ .
Proof: See Appendix A.
The above lemma suggests that, when the salary constraint limits the manager’s
ability to extract rent, the additional channel of stock-based compensation is used for
full extraction of rent. Therefore the owner’s (IR) is binding under the manager-designed
contract with or without the salary constraint. The implication is that the salary con-
straint should increase the manager’s stock-based compensation.
Proposition 4: Given the salary constraint b ≤ β¯ < βp, the manager’s stock-based
compensation is larger and the effort level is higher under the optimal manager-designed
contract than those under the optimal manager-designed contract without the salary
constraint. That is, αc ≥ αp and ec ≥ ep.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 implies that, in the realistic case where the manager’s salary has an
upper bound, we are led to empirical predictions different from the ones in Corollary 2.
First, the manager’s stock-based compensation should be larger in firms where the man-
ager has more power. This is because salary is no longer the vehicle through which the
powerful manager can fully extract rent from the owner. Instead stock-based compen-
sation is used as an additional channel for rent extraction. The manager awards himself
more stock-based compensation when there is a salary ceiling, which increases his income
risk and effort incentives. This implies that the manager exerts more effort, higher than
the (second-best) optimal level, which translates into better firm performance when per-
formance is measured in stock price. In addition, larger stock-based compensation for
the manager implies that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial contract should
also be higher in firms where the manager has more power. On the other hand, this over-
incentivization is detrimental to outside shareholders when performance is measured net
of the manager’s compensation.
Again we consider the bargaining game between the owner and the manager where
the manager’s bargaining power is represented by γ ∈ [0, 1] and denote the solution
by (αγ , βγ). If γ = 1, then the solution to the bargaining problem is (αc, β¯) and, if
γ = 0, then the solution is (αa, βa). Since αc ≥ αa and β¯ > βa, both αγ and βγ
are increasing in γ. Thus, unlike the case without salary constraint, the manager’s
stock-based compensation increases in managerial power. As before, let us define gross
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firm performance as the expected stock price, y¯(eγ), and net firm performance as the
expected return to the owner, V (γ) ≡ (1− αγ)y¯(eγ)− βγ . Then it it is immediate that
gross firm performance and the manager’s stock-based compensation are both increasing
in managerial power. However, net firm performance decreases in managerial power as
the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5: V (γ) ≡ (1− αγ)y¯(eγ)− βγ decreases in γ.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The discussions so far lead us to the following hypotheses.
Corollary 6: In firms where the manager’s salary constraint is binding, (i) the size of
the manager’s stock-based compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity of man-
agement compensation increase in managerial power, (ii) firm performance gross of the
manager’s compensation increases in managerial power, and (iii) firm performance net
of the manager’s compensation decreases in managerial power.
4. Hypotheses, Regression Models and Variable Description
4.1. Summary of testable hypotheses
Our theoretical results of the previous section, Corollaries 2 and 6 in particular, lead
us to several hypotheses regarding the relation among CEO power, CEO’s stock-based
compensation, and firm performance, depending on whether there is a constraint on the
CEO’s salary. The first step in our empirical analyses is to divide our sample of firms
into two groups: those that perceive that there is no constraint on the CEO’s salary and
those that perceive that there is a constraint. As discussed earlier, the 1994 change in
the tax treatment of executive compensation in the US allows us a natural experiment
in which $1 million can be considered as a threshold level of CEO’s salary. Plotting
CEOs’ salary for S&P500 firms for our sample period of 2001-2005 produces Figure 1.
As shown, the largest number of observations are around the salary band of $0.95 - 1.05
million. Although this is not a definitive proof, one can reasonably argue that some firms
do seem to perceive $1 million as an important constraint.(19)
— Figure 1 goes about here. —
(19) Although our full sample covers S&P1500, the main empirical analyses are for the S&P500 sub-
sample since the million dollar rule seems more meaningful for these firms.
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Consequently we divide our sample of firms into two groups: those with the CEO’s
salary above $1 million, called the ‘unconstrained’ group, and those with the CEO’s
salary below $1 million, called the ‘constrained’ group. The firms in our ‘constrained’
group pay salaries less than $1 million either because their size limits the amount of
salaries that can be paid or because they perceive that the salary constraint is important
and, as a result, they do not violate the so-called ‘outrage constraint’.(20) Thus our
hypotheses are:
(H1) The size of the CEO’s stock-based compensation is independent of CEO power in
the unconstrained group but increases in CEO power in the constrained group.
(H2) The pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s stock-based compensation is indepen-
dent of CEO power in the unconstrained group but increases in CEO power in the
constrained group.
(H3) Gross firm performance is independent of CEO power in the unconstrained group
but increases in CEO power in the constrained group.
(H4) Firm performance net of management compensation decreases in CEO power in
both groups of firms.
4.2. Description of variables
Central to our empirical analyses are the proxy variables for CEO power and the
measurement of firm performance in gross as well as net terms. Following the existing
studies reviewed in Section 2, we measure CEO power in relation to various governance
mechanisms: board characteristics, ownership structure, and shareholder rights. As for
firm performance, we choose the commonly used performance measures such as market
value of equity, Tobin’s Q, and accounting return on assets. One innovation of our paper
is that we consider both gross and net performance measures, as will be detailed later.
The definition of all the variables is given in Appendix B.
4.2.1. Measuring CEO power: board of directors
To measure CEO power based on board structure, we first consider the following
five variables: (1) board size, which is the number of directors on the board; (2) duality,
which is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO also serves as the board chair,
(20) Note that firms paying strictly less than $1 million are perfectly consistent with our analysis
because the compensation data we observe should show the weighted average of the two polar cases we
have analyzed where the weight depends on CEO power. Unless the CEO has full bargaining power,
salary can be less than $1 million, increasing continuously in CEO power. In the ‘constrained’ firm, the
CEO’s salary will be equal to $1 million only if the CEO has full bargaining power.
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and 0 otherwise; (3) executive representation on the compensation committee, which
is the percentage of executive directors on the compensation committee; (4) board in-
dependence, which is the proportion of directors who are independent; and (5) busy
directors, which is the proportion of directors with bad attendance records (less than
75 percent attendance) according to the ExecuComp database.(21) While these original
variables are informative of board structure, they are not in the same scale for construc-
tion of a composite variable used for our empirical analyses, nor do they reflect possible
inter-industry differences.
We thus construct four additional indicator variables based on all but the duality
variable so that all five variables assume values of 0 or 1: the indicator for board size
equals 1 if board size is above the industry median, and 0 otherwise; the indicator for
executive representation on the compensation committee equals 1 if at least one executive
sits on the compensation committee, and 0 otherwise; the indicator for non-independent
board equals 1 if the board does not have majority independent outside directors, and 0
otherwise; and the indicator for busy board equals 1 if the proportion of directors with
bad attendance records is above industry median, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with the
literature reviewed in Section 2, we posit that CEO power is larger if the board size is
too big, if the CEO is also the board chair, if the CEO or the CEO’s top lieutenants sit
on the compensation committee, if fewer directors are independent, and if directors are
too busy to properly monitor the firm. A CEO would have an original score between 0
(i.e. the least powerful CEO) and 5 (i.e. the most powerful CEO). Finally we form a
single measure of CEO power, Power BOD, as the first principal component of these
five indicators, whose value is scaled to lie between 0 and 1. Power BOD is essentially a
weighted average of the above five indicators, with ‘optimal weights’ determined through
a principal component analysis, which takes into account the correlation (i.e. information
redundancy) among the five variables.(22) We also consider an alternative single measure,
Power BOD2, which is the equal-weighted average of these five indicators.
4.2.2. Measuring CEO power: concentrated ownership
To measure CEO power on the dimension of ownership concentration, we start with
the following four variables: (1) CEO ownership, which is the CEO’s percentage share
(21) We thank Paul Grout for suggesting this variable. In the previous draft of the paper, we measured
busy directors based on the number of outside boards each non-executive director sits on. However, more
outside board membership may reflect a director’s superior ability rather than ineffectiveness to monitor
CEOs.
(22) The first principal component explains 38 percent of total variation of the original five board
variables.
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ownership; (2) CEO voting, which is the CEO’s percentage voting power; (3) director
ownership, which is non-executive directors’ percentage share ownership; and (4) insti-
tutional ownership, which is the percentage share ownership of the firm’s institutional
investors. Next we construct three indicators based on these four variables: the indicator
for the ratio of CEO voting power to CEO ownership equals 1 if the CEO’s voting power
is at least 1.5 times his share ownership, and 0 otherwise;(23) the indicator for director
ownership equals 1 if non-executive directors as a group hold shares less than the in-
dustry median, and 0 otherwise; and the indicator for institutional ownership equals 1
if institutional investors collectively hold shares less than the industry median, and 0
otherwise. We posit that CEO power is larger if the CEO has more voting power and if
fewer blockholders exist to monitor the CEO. To mitigate the problem of multicollinear-
ity, we again employ a principal component analysis and define the first principal factor
as Power OWN , whose value is scaled to lie between 0 and 1.(24) As before, we also
consider an alternative composite measure, Power OWN2, which is the equal-weighted
average of these three indicators.
4.2.3. Measuring CEO power: shareholder rights
For the measurement of CEO power along the dimension of shareholder rights,
we consider both the GIM-index created by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), and
the BCF-index constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). The GIM-index is
based on 24 firm-level anti-takeover provisions and the measures of officer and director
protection. The BCF-index, based on only 6 out of the 24 provisions used in the GIM-
index, includes four constitutional provisions that prevent a majority of shareholders
from having their way, and two takeover readiness provisions that boards put in place to
be ready for a hostile takeover. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell find that this ‘entrenchment
index’ fully drives the relation between the GIM-index and firm performance. One could
argue that the BCF-index is a better proxy for CEO power than the more comprehensive
GIM-index, which can be considered as a proxy for a firm’s overall governance. We use
both indices in this study. Our Power BCF equals a firm’s original BCF-index divided
by 6, and our Power GIM equals a firm’s original GIM-index divided by 18.(25) Both
measures thus also lie between 0 and 1. We posit that the CEO of a firm is more likely
(23) In our S&P1500 sample, the median voting-to-ownership ratio is about 1.5 for CEOs with both
ownership and voting rights information. For those CEOs with only ownership information, we assume
their voting rights are the same as their equity ownership in the firm.
(24) The first principal component alone explains 40 percent of total variation of the original three
ownership variables.
(25) In our sample, the BCF-index ranges between 0 and 6 while GIM-index ranges between 2 and 18.
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and able to influence the level and structure of his compensation package if the firm has
more restrictions on investors and/or has a more entrenched executive team.
4.2.4. Firm performance measures
As we have argued previously, care should be taken in measuring firm performance.
Some performance measures commonly used in the literature do not adequately account
for the extent to which shareholder value is diluted by executives’ stock-based compen-
sation. As a consequence, they can exaggerate the incentive effects of CEO pay even
though it can be detrimental to outside shareholders, suggesting that the distinction
needs to be made between gross and net performance measures.
In distinguishing between gross and net performance measures, we need to calculate
the value of compensation for the CEO (or a team of senior executives who can be
reasonably regarded to exercise control over their own pay and significantly affect overall
performance of the firm) in the current contractual period if it is not already reflected in
the reported performance measure such as ROA or the available performance information
such as stock price. For example, cash salary and bonus are subtracted from reported
earnings but restricted stock or options are not often accounted for as expenses. The net
performance measure should capture the value that accrues to only those shareholders
existing at the time a new contract is offered to the CEO. What matters here is the
value of stock-based compensation for the CEO during the current contractual period
that is not already reflected in the performance measure. The net performance measure
is derived after accounting for the value of such stock-based compensation. This does
not mean, however, that the value of all stock-based compensation for the CEO should
be accounted for. The CEO may already own shares or options in the beginning of a
contractual period. For that portion of share ownership, the CEO should be legitimately
considered to be one of the existing shareholders whose interest should be served just
like any other shareholders.
Our first two performance measures are based on stock price. The net return to
shareholders at time t is defined as:
NTSRt =
Pt × Sharest−1 − Pt−1 × Sharest−1 +Dividendt
Pt−1 × Sharest−1 (10)
where Pt is stock price at time t, Sharest−1 is the number of shares outstanding at time
t− 1, and Dividendt is the dollar value of dividend paid between time t− 1 and t. This
is the usual definition of total shareholder return (TSR) and only captures the change in
the value of shares outstanding at time t− 1. As this does not include any stock-based
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compensation for the CEO newly awarded during the period, it is our net performance
measure.
The next performance measure is Tobin’s Q. As discussed earlier in relation to the
findings by Garvey and Milbourn (2002), market value of equity does not fully reflect
the dilution effect until stock options and restricted stock are vested and exercised. Thus
Tobin’s Q can be considered as a gross performance measure:
GAV Qt =
Pt × Sharest +Debtt
Assett
. (11)
The last performance measure is return on assets (ROA). Since 2005, most firms are
required to take an accounting charge for stock options granted to employees. During
our sample period of 2001-2005, some firms do report separately the expenses related to
employees’ options using the fair value method, which would contaminate the interpre-
tation of ROA. To identify the extent of this problem, we first use fair value of options
granted during the year (Compustat variable OPTFVGR) as an indicator of whether a
firm used the fair value method in reporting the adjusted income in a particular year.
Virtually no sample firms reported OPTFVGR during 2001-2003. Given that these firms
did not take accounting charges of options in reporting income, ROA can be considered
as a gross performance measure. During 2004-2005, however, about 80 percent of our
S&P500 sample firms reported OPTFVGR. For these firms, the reported income has
taken into account option expenses. To be consistent with ROA for the 2001-2003 sub-
sample and those firms that did not report OPTFVGR during 2004-2005, we need to
make an adjustment to income for firms that reported OPTFVGR. Compustat variable
XINTOPT represents the decrease in income attributed to the added expense of stock-
based compensation that are not fully recognized on the income statement. Thus we add
XINTOPT back to income, based on which ROA is calculated. This again gives us a
gross performance measure for firms that reported OPTFVGR during 2004-2005. Thus
our gross performance measure is
GROAt =
EBITDAt
Assett
(12)
where EBITDAt is income for t = 2001, 2002, 2003 and, for t = 2004, 2005, income for
firms that did not report OPTFVGR, and income plus XINTOPT for the remaining
firms that reported OPTFVGR.
In sum, we have one net performance measure (NTSR) and two gross performance
measures (GAVQ, GROA).
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4.2.5. Instruments and control variables
The issue of endogeneity has been widely acknowledged in empirical corporate fi-
nance. To capture the endogenous nature of the relation among managerial power, firm
performance, and CEO ownership, we use a system of simultaneous equations. Critical
to the consistent estimation of the system of equations is the choice of instrumental vari-
ables. Following Bhagat and Bolton (2008), we construct three instrumental variables
(IV) for power, performance, and CEO ownership: as an IV for CEO power, we use the
percentage of directors who are currently active CEOs as a measure of network among
CEOs; as an IV for firm performance, we use the ratio of stock repurchase to total as-
sets as a measure of the CEO’s perception of firm performance(26); as an IV for CEO
ownership, we use the ratio of CEO tenure to CEO age as a measure of CEO quality. In
addition, we use the CEO’s age as an instrument for the size of CEO’s stock-based pay.
We control for firm-level variables that may affect the CEO’s stock-based compen-
sation, firm performance, and the relation between compensation and firm performance.
These variables include (1) firm size, measured as logarithm of total sales (or total assets),
(2) leverage, defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (3) growth, measured
as the sales growth rate in the past three years, or growth opportunity measured as the
market-to-book equity ratio, and (4) risk, measured as the standard deviation of stock
returns over the previous 60 months.
4.3. Model specification
To test (H1), we first consider a simple multivariate regression model, in which the
dependent variable is either the dollar value of CEO’s stock-based compensation, or the
value of CEO’s stock-based compensation as a percentage of his total pay. Independent
variables are measures of CEO power. We control for firm characteristics, industry fixed
effects and time trends.
(Stock based Pay)i,t = α+ β0(Dmil)i,t + β1(Power)i,t
+β2(Dmil × Power)i,t + β3(Controls)i,t (13)
where Dmil is an indicator variable that equals one for the constrained group and zero
for the unconstrained group. The extent to which CEO power affects his stock-based
(26) The idea is the same as that of Palia (2001) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008): a firm is most likely
to buy back its shares when managers of the firm believe that its shares are underpriced. Bhagat and
Bolton (2008) use the ratio of treasury stock to total assets as the instrument for performance.
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compensation is measured by β1 in the unconstrained group and β1+β2 in the constrained
group.
To address potential endogeneity of the CEO’s stock-based pay and managerial
power, we also run a 2-stage least squares (2SLS): we first find the predicted values of
the CEO’s stock-based pay and CEO power using their respective instruments, after
which we re-evaluate equation (16). Under (H1), we expect β1 to be equal to zero and
β1 + β2 to be positive.
To test (H2), we estimate the sensitivity of the change in the value of CEO’s
stock-based compensation to the change in shareholder value. This is similar to pay-
performance sensitivity estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990b) except that we use
the value of CEO’s stock-based compensation, instead of total compensation, as the de-
pendent variable. We regress the change in the value of CEO’s stock-based compensation
on the change in shareholder value, interaction between CEO power and the change in
shareholder value, and an additional interaction term to distinguish between the two
groups of firms. We control for fixed effects.
∆(Stock based Pay)i,t = γ + δ0(∆Shareholder V alue)i,t
+ δ1(Power ×∆Shareholder V alue)i,t + δ2(Dmil × Power ×∆Shareholder V alue)i,t
(14)
where (∆Shareholder V alue)t = (Pt−Pt−1)×Sharest−1+Dividendt is the dollar value
of returns to shareholders during period t and Dmil is again the indicator variable that
equals one for the constrained group and zero otherwise. Power is a variable measuring
CEO power, which ranges from 0 to 1. The pay-performance sensitivity for a firm in the
unconstrained group equals δ0 + δ1 × Power where δ1 represents the relation between
the sensitivity coefficient and CEO power. Thus, in the unconstrained group, the pay-
performance sensitivity for the least powerful CEO is δ0 and that for the most powerful
CEO is δ0 + δ1. Similarly, the pay-performance sensitivity for a firm in the constrained
group equals δ0 + (δ1 + δ2)× Power with δ1 + δ2 representing the relation between the
sensitivity and CEO power. Under (H2), we expect δ1 to be equal to zero and δ1+ δ2 to
be positive.
To test (H3) and (H4), we begin with a simple t-test on mean values of performance
variables, both gross and net, between constrained and unconstrained groups. We then
analyze the relation between performance and CEO power with the following system of
simultaneous equations, similar to those in Bhagat and Bolton (2008):
Performance = f(Dmil, Power, Dmil × Power, Ownership, Z1, C1),
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Power = g(Performance, Ownership, Z2, C2),
Ownership = h(Performance, Power, Z3, C3) (15)
where Ownership represents the CEO’s share ownership, Z1, Z2, Z3 are instrumental
variables, and C1, C2, C3 represent firm-level control variables and industry fixed effects,
all described in Section 4.2.5.
We estimate the system using a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure. In the
first stage, we estimate the endogenously determined CEO power, firm performance,
and CEO ownership with their instruments. In the second stage, we regress dependent
variables on the predicted values from the first stage, firm-level controls and fixed-effect
variables. Within this system of equations, we focus on the performance equation, as we
are interested in the impact of CEO power on firm performance. Under (H3), we expect
the coefficient of CEO power on performance to be zero in the unconstrained group, and
positive in the constrained group. Under (H4), we expect the coefficients to be negative
in both groups of firms.
5. Data
Our sample consists of S&P1500 firms over the period of 2001-2005. We require all sam-
ple firms to be in the S&P1500 list in any of these years, to have CEO compensation
data from the Compustat ExecuComp database,(27) and to have assets and market value
data in the Compustat database over the sample period. According to ExecuComp, total
compensation is measured as the sum of cash compensation including salary and cash
bonus, stock-based compensation including restricted stock and stock options granted
during the year, long-term incentive payments, and other compensation payout not sep-
arately disclosed anywhere else. We exclude firms in financial services (SIC 60-67) and
utilities (SIC 49). We also exclude firms that are deemed as ‘foreign’ entities for tax
purposes, classified using Compustat incorporation code, FINC.(28) Our sample includes
a panel of 4,727 firm-year observations representing 1,036 different firms.
(27) The SEC expanded and enhanced disclosure rules for U.S. executives in 1992, with requirements
on disclosing on stock ownership, stock options, and other compensation components for the top five
corporate executives. Some perquisites and deferred payments, however, are not required for disclosure.
(28) Our argument here echoes that of Chhaocharia and Grinstein (2006). Companies deemed as
‘foreign’ entities for tax purposes are not subject to the US tax rules, including those regarding executive
compensation. Within our S&P1500 sample, we identify 12 foreign companies based on Compustat
incorporation code, FINC (FINC = 0 for US companies). Some of these companies, such as Nabors
Industries and Tyco International, were US companies for business purposes but had renounced their US
corporate citizenship and moved, on the paper, offshore for tax purposes. We exclude all 12 companies
from our sample.
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A summarizes salary,
stock-based compensation and total compensation of CEOs in our sample. Since our
main focus is on stock-based compensation with sample firms divided into two groups
based on CEOs’ salary, we do not report other components of CEO compensation such as
bonus or long-term incentive payments. All figures in Panel A are skewed, consistent with
existing empirical literature. The median total compensation (stock-based compensation,
resp.) for CEOs increased from $2.93 million ($1.383, resp.) in 2001 to $3.6 ($1.547,
resp.) million in 2005.
In Panel B we report CEO compensation separately for firms whose CEO salary
is no more than $1 million, and for firms whose CEO salary is above $1 million. As
discussed earlier, we call the first group of firms the ‘constrained’ group, and the second,
the ‘unconstrained’ group. The constrained group accounts for 86% of our sample,
or 4,055 firm-year observations from 924 different firms. In dollar terms, firms in the
constrained group pay much less total and stock-based CEO compensation than those in
the unconstrained group. As a percentage of total pay, however, firms in the constrained
group pay more stock-based compensation than those in the unconstrained group. For
small-cap firms, stock-based compensation as a percentage of total CEO compensation
is 31% in the unconstrained group and 40% in the constrained group. For medium-size
firms, it is 36% in the unconstrained group and 44% in the constrained group. For
S&P500 firms, it is 53% in the unconstrained group and 54% in the constrained group.
Next, we observe that CEOs of S&P500 firms receive more total compensation than
their counterparts in S&P SmallCap and S&P MediumCap firms. This echoes the well-
documented positive relation between executive compensation and firm size when size
is measured by market capitalization (e.g., Gabaix and Landier, 2008) or by accounting
figures. In both groups of S&P 500 firms, the difference in total pay according to firm size
is largely due to various incentive components including stock-based compensation, with
salary contributing to only a small difference in total pay. The fact that the median salary
is quite close $1 million in the unconstrained group seems to suggest that a significant
number of firms still perceive the $1 million rule as an important factor to consider in
designing their CEO compensation. Outright abuse of CEO power in extracting rent
through salary seems to be an exception, rather than a rule.
— Table 1 goes about here. —
Table 2 reports the t-test results on CEO power measures related to board char-
acteristics, ownership concentration, and shareholder rights. CEO power variables are
extracted from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), Board Analyst (now
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Corporate Library), ExecuComp databases, and Professor Lucian Bebchuk’s website.(29)
However, shareholder rights scores such as the GIM-index and BCF-index are not avail-
able every year. Consistent with other studies such as Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003),
we assume that, between any two available adjacent index scores, a firm’s score is the
simple average of these two.
The summary information offers a number of observations. First, firm size mat-
ters when it comes to board composition. Compared to small and medium-size firms,
large firms tend to have larger and more independent boards, to be more likely to have
combined CEO-chairs, and their outside directors tend to be busier and more likely to
miss board meetings. These are consistent with the findings of Coles et al. (2008) that
bigger (and complex) firms have larger boards with more outside directors. For small
and medium-size firms, differences between the constrained and unconstrained groups in
board characteristics are largely insignificant. For the S&P500 sub-sample, firms in the
unconstrained group tend to have larger and more independent boards, and more likely
to have CEOs also chairing the boards.(30) The above relation between firm size and
board composition is reflected in the composite power index based on board composi-
tion. When CEO power is measured by Power BOD or Power BOD2, the difference in
CEO power between the constrained and unconstrained groups is largely insignificant for
small and medium-size firms. For S&P500 firms, however, CEOs in the unconstrained
group are more powerful than their counterparts in the constrained group.
Second, CEOs hold more voting rights than their cash flow rights, with an average
voting-to-ownership ratio of roughly 1.5.(31) For small and medium-size firms, CEOs in
the unconstrained group tend to hold more shares than those in the constrained group.
Non-executive directors of S&P500 firms tend to own more shares in the unconstrained
group. For small and medium-size firms, the differences in CEO voting rights, director
ownership and institutional ownership between the two groups are largely insignificant.
As a result, the difference in CEO power between the constrained and unconstrained
groups is again insignificant for small and medium-size firms when CEO power is mea-
sured by Power OWN or Power OWN2.
Third, for small and medium-size firms, there is little difference in CEO power
(29) http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.
(30) Although not reported here, we also observe that US boards have become increasingly independent
over time, with average percentage of executive directors on boards decreasing from 34.7% in 2001 to
only 17.8% in 2005, average percentage of executives on compensation committees decreasing from 9.7%
in 2001 to less than 0.1% in 2005. Such a trend is also reported in other studies such as Conyon (2006).
(31) We have information on the percentage of CEO voting rights for only 2,510 firm-year observations,
roughly half of the total sample size. For the rest of firm-year observations of which we have information
on CEO ownership, we assume that a CEO’s voting power is the same as his equity ownership.
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between the constrained and unconstrained groups when CEO power is measured by
either indices of shareholder rights. For the S&P500 sub-sample, however, CEOs in the
unconstrained group are more powerful than their counterparts in the constrained group
when power is measured by the GIM-index.
In sum, Table 2 tells us that (1) for small and medium-size firms, there is little
difference in CEO power between the constrained and unconstrained groups in all three
composite indices of CEO power; (2) for the S&P500 sub-sample, CEOs of unconstrained
group are more powerful than those in the constrained group when power is measured by
Power BOD and Power GIM , but less powerful when it is measured by Power OWN .
Since Power OWN is positively related to CEO ownership ceteris paribus, the latter is
generally consistent with our story that, in the constrained group, powerful CEOs can
use stock-based pay as an additional vehicle for rent extraction.
— Table 2 goes about here. —
Table 3 reports the gross and net performance measures and firm-level control vari-
ables, separately for the constrained and unconstrained groups, and across different size
categories. All variables are constructed based on data obtained from the Compustat
database. Compared to firms in the unconstrained group, those in the constrained group
on average have lower accounting rates of return across all size categories, although the
difference is insignificant for medium-size firms. When performance is measured in To-
bin’s Q or total shareholder return, S&P500 firms in the constrained group perform
better in both measures while, for small and medium-size firms, there is little difference
in performance between the constrained and unconstrained groups. In addition, firms
in the constrained group are on average significantly smaller, with more volatile share
prices, and have lower financial leverage.
— Table 3 goes about here. —
The general message from Tables 1-3 is the stark difference between the constrained
and unconstrained groups of firms in CEO compensation, firm characteristics, firm per-
formance in both accounting-based and market-based measures, and in CEO power re-
flected in the characteristics of their boards, ownership concentration and shareholder
rights provisions. The difference is most pronounced and significant for the S&P500 sub-
sample: firms in the unconstrained group pay their CEOs better both in total pay and in
stock-based pay, although the proportion of stock-based pay is larger in the constrained
group; CEOs in the unconstrained group are more powerful when power is measured by
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board characteristics and shareholder rights provisions, although they are less so when
power is measured by ownership concentration; firms in the unconstrained group perform
better in accounting-based measures but not so in market-based measures; firms in the
unconstrained group tend to be larger with less volatile share prices and higher financial
leverage. For small and medium-size firms, the difference is often insignificant, largely
due to the overwhelming presence of constrained group in these two sub-samples: 95%
(99%, resp.) of S&P MediumCap (SmallCap, resp.) firms belongs to the constrained
group. In the next section, we turn to our main empirical analyses, focusing only on
the S&P500 sub-sample, which comprises 1,074 firm-year observations representing 350
different firms in the S&P500 index.
6. Main Findings
6.1. Do powerful CEOs receive larger stock-based compensation?
Our first hypothesis, (H1), is that the size of the CEO’s stock-based compensation
is independent of CEO power in the unconstrained group but increases in CEO power
in the constrained group. To test (H1), we estimate equation (13). Table 4 reports the
results of both OLS and 2SLS regression models of CEO’s stock-based compensation
on four different measures of CEO power, which are explained in Section 4.2. Panel A
uses the level of stock-based compensation (measured in $1,000) as a dependent variable,
while Panel B uses stock-based compensation as a percentage of total pay as a depen-
dent variable. The key explanatory variables are the measure of CEO power whose
coefficient is β1 in equation (13), and the interaction term between Dmil and Power
whose coefficient is β2 in equation (13). (H1) implies β1 = 0 and β1 + β2 > 0.
First, we observe that, after taking into account the effects of firm-level control
variables and fixed effects, stock-based pay for CEOs in the two groups is similar both
in dollar terms and as a percentage of their total compensation. This is reflected in the
insignificant coefficients to Dmil.
Second, most results are consistent with the first part of (H1), β1 = 0, whether
stock-based pay is measured in dollar terms or as a percentage of total pay. After
controlling for firm characteristics and fixed effects, the CEO’s stock-based compensation
is independent of CEO power in the unconstrained group. This is shown in Panel C: the
regression coefficients to β1 are all insignificant at the 5% level. The only exception is
when CEO power is measured based on the GIM-index scores: stock-based pay decreases
in CEO power. A possible explanation is that, as we argued previously, the GIM-index is
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more a proxy for a firm’s overall governance than a proxy for CEO power. Consequently
one may interpret the negative relation between the CEO’s stock-based pay and the
GIM-index scores as reflecting the conventional agency theory: in firms with stronger
governance (low GIM-index scores), CEOs tend to be provided with stronger incentives
(more stock-based pay). With the BCF-index which we think is a better proxy for CEO
power than the GIM-index, the relation between CEO power and the CEO’s stock-based
pay remains insignificant.
Third, we find weak support for the second part of (H1), β1 + β2 > 0. The re-
gression coefficients are insignificant across all models when the dependent variable is
the dollar amount of CEO’s stock-based pay. With stock-based pay as a percentage of
total compensation, we find only marginally significant results on Power BOD. This
is shown in Panel C: the 2SLS result suggests that the most powerful CEO in the con-
strained group would receive 11.39 percent (p-value 0.053) more stock-based pay than
the least powerful CEO in the same group. Given that the median value of CEO’s total
pay for our sample of S&P500 firms in the constrained group is around $5.56 million,
this difference corresponds to about $633,000 in stock-based pay. Although the second
part of (H1) does not have statistically significant support, our results indicate that the
CEO’s stock-based pay does increase more in CEO power in the constrained group than
in the unconstrained group, i.e., β2 > 0: when stock-based compensation is measured
in dollar terms, the interaction term between Power BOD and Dmil is significantly
positive; when stock-based compensation is measured as a percentage of total pay, the
interaction term between Power BCF and Dmil is also positive and significant.
Finally, in both groups of firms, stock price volatility is positively related to the
CEO’s stock-based compensation, both in level and as a percentage of total pay. On
the other hand, the CEO’s existing share ownership is negatively related to subsequent
stock-based pay he receives. A possible explanation is that, as the CEO’s existing share
ownership increases, additional stock-based pay provides less marginal (portfolio) in-
centives while imposing more risk on the CEO. There is also a positive and significant
relation between firm growth and the CEO’s stock-based pay, although the relation be-
tween firm size and the CEO’s stock-based pay is more or less insignificant.
Overall, our results are different from those in Harzell and Starks (2003) and Conyon
and He (2004). These authors found that less CEO power leads to more incentive-
based compensation for CEOs, possibly because smaller CEO power implies a more
effective role played by monitors such as institutional investors or the members of the
compensation committee. More effective monitors would in turn make more use of
incentive-based compensation. As our theoretical arguments demonstrated, however, it
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is not rational for powerful CEOs to reduce their own incentives suboptimally if they can
extract rent in an efficiency-neutral way. If the latter is not the case as in the constrained
group of our sample, then CEO power can lead to more stock-based compensation as it
can be used as an additional channel for rent extraction. In this sense, our results are
consistent with Benz et al. (2001), Cyert et al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005),
who all found that CEO power is positively related to CEOs’ stock-based compensation.
— Table 4 goes about here. —
6.2. Are powerful CEOs paid to perform?
Our second hypothesis, (H2), is that the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s
stock-based compensation is independent of CEO power in the unconstrained group, but
increases in CEO power in the constrained group. To test (H2), we estimate equation
(14). Table 5 summarizes the OLS regression results.(32) The key explanatory variables
are the interaction term between the measure of CEO power and the change in share-
holder value, whose coefficient is δ1 in equation (14), and the interaction term between
Dmil and the above variable, whose coefficient is δ2 in equation (14). (H2) implies
δ1 = 0 and δ1+ δ2 > 0. Consistent with the existing literature, we only control for fixed
effects since firm-level control variables vanish on first-differencing.
We first observe that a CEO’s stock-based compensation on average increases by 8.2
cents per thousand-dollar increase in shareholder value. In the constrained group, the
pay-performance sensitivity is 20.1 cents per thousand dollars although, in the uncon-
strained group, the coefficient is insignificant. Pearson correlations, not reported here,
also confirm a significantly positive (insignificantly negative, resp.) correlation between
dollar change in CEO stock-based compensation and dollar change in shareholder value
for the constrained (unconstrained, resp.) firms.
These pay-performance sensitivity estimates are not directly comparable to the
widely cited estimates by Jensen and Murphy (1990b), where the pay-performance sensi-
tivity varies from 3.29 cents (Table 1, p. 229) to $2 (Table 2, p. 234) per thousand dollar
increase in shareholder wealth. The former estimate is for CEO total pay that includes
salary, bonus, value of restricted stock, and other benefits, while the latter estimate is
for a broader definition of CEO wealth that includes additionally the value of stock held
or controlled by the CEO and the value of stock options awarded during the period.(33)
(32) To make interpretation easier, we scaled all the coefficients into dollar change in stock-based pay
per thousand dollar change in shareholder value.
(33) The total pay-performance sensitivity in Jensen and Murphy (1999b), which includes additionally
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Our estimates are based only on the value of CEO’s stock-based compensation awarded
during the period as reported in ExecuComp. While this would obviously underestimate
the actual pay-performance sensitivity as shown by Hall and Liebman (1998), our focus
is not on the estimation of the pay-performance sensitivity per se, but on whether CEO
power affects it differently between the constrained and unconstrained groups.
Second, regression results are mostly consistent with (H2). Panel B shows that
the relation between CEO power and the pay-performance sensitivity of his stock-based
compensation is mostly insignificant in the unconstrained group, which is consistent
with the first part of (H2). In the constrained group, the pay-performance sensitivity
is positively related to CEO power in all measures of CEO power except Power GIM ,
which supports the second part of (H2). For example, when we measure CEO power
using the BCF-index scores, the most powerful CEO’s stock-based pay increases by $1.06
more than that of the least powerful CEO in the constrained group.
— Table 5 goes about here. —
6.3. Are powerful CEOs better at improving firm performance?
Our final hypotheses, (H3) and (H4), concern the relation between firm performance
and CEO power. First, when performance is measured in gross terms, firm performance
should be independent of CEO power in the unconstrained group, but increase in CEO
power in the constrained group. Second, when performance is measured net of executives’
stock-based compensation, CEO power should lead to lower firm performance in both
groups of firms. To test these hypotheses, we estimate the system of equations (15).
Regression results are summarized in Table 6.
First, regression results on gross performance provide some support for (H3). In
the unconstrained group, the relation between CEO power and gross firm performance
is insignificant when performance is measured by GAVQ or GROA. In the constrained
group, CEO power measured in terms of board composition is positively and significantly
associated with GAVQ. Using this combination - Power BOD and GAVQ - the most
powerful CEO in the constrained group is associated with a 0.794 percentage point
higher GAVQ than the least powerful CEO in the same group. When performance is
measure by GROA, there is some indication of positive association between power and
incentives generated from the threat of dismissal, is $3.25 for $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth.
Jensen and Murphy’s estimates are much smaller than those from Hall and Liebman (1998), who found
that large part of pay-performance sensitivity is explained by the value of stock and stock options
awarded previously.
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firm performance in the constrained group but the relation is not statistically significant
at the conventional level.
Second, our results in Table 6 do not provide support for (H4), which examines
the relation between CEO power and firm’s net performance. When power is measured
by Power BOD, there is some indication of negative relation between CEO power and
NTSR for both the unconstrained and constrained groups. But the coefficients are not
significant. Moreover, there is even a positive association between net performance and
CEO power when power is measured based on the BCF-index scores. A possible expla-
nation could be that the scope of CEO power may need to be broadened to have better
understanding of how CEO power affects firm performance. Our theoretical prediction
was driven entirely based on one dimension of power, that is, the power the CEO has
to influence his own pay. This was mainly to formalize the main tenet of the manage-
rial power theory and put its implications under empirical scrutiny. Overall, our results
on (H3) and (H4) suggest that the managerial power theory has limited relevance in
explaining the relation between power and performance.
— Table 6 goes about here. —
6.4. Robustness checks
In this section, we check robustness of our results in Section 6.3 by performing
additional tests. To save space, the results are not reported here, but available upon
request from the authors.
6.4.1. Alternative measures of CEO power
In Tables 4-6, CEO power based on board characteristics is measured by the first
principal component of the five indicator variables. Similarly CEO power based on own-
ership concentration is the first principal component of the three indicator variables.
The main reason for using the first principal components was to avoid potential infor-
mation redundancy. However, a possible criticism of this approach is potential loss of
information. To address this, we used alternative power measures based on board char-
acteristics and ownership concentration. Since Power BCF and Power GIM are both
normalized simple counts of corporate provisions, we constructed Power BOD2 and
Power OWN2 in the same way these counts are constructed. Specifically, we started
with simple counts of the five indicators for board characteristics and the three indicators
for ownership concentration, after which we normalized the counts by dividing them by 5
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and 3, respectively. We re-ran all the regression models using these alternative measures
of CEO power. Our main results remain qualitatively the same.
6.4.2. Contemporaneous performance and subsequent performance
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) document a positive relation between good corporate
governance and the firm’s subsequent operating performance. Our main empirical tests
examined the relation between various measures of CEO power and contemporaneous
firm performance. As a robustness check, we re-ran the regressions for (H3) and (H4)
using firm performance measures of the following year as the dependent variable. We do
not find significant difference from our main results.
6.4.3. Sub-sample effect
Our findings in Section 6.3 are based only on the S&P500 sub-sample. In the full
S&P1500 sample we initially constructed, the constrained group consists of 73 percent
of S&P500 firms and 96 percent of S&P MediumCap and S&P Smallcap firms. During
the sample period of 2001-2005, the proportion of small and medium-size firms in the
constrained group was more or less unchanged. But the proportion of large firms in
the constrained group decreased noticeably from 73 percent in 2001 to 67 percent in
2005. This indicates that the dramatic increase in stock-based compensation might be
predominately true for large firms. As a robustness check, we repeated all the analyses
using the full S&P1500 sample. Again, our main results are qualitatively unchanged.
A second robustness check we performed along this line, related to Chhaocharia and
Grinstein (2006), has to do with the potential bias associated with a firm’s entry/exit in
the sample. Excluding firms that are not in the sample over the entire five-year period
reduces size of S&P500 sub-sample from 1,704 firm-year observations (350 different firms)
to 1,650 observations (330 different firms). Our main results hold when we exclude these
firms.
A third robustness check, again following Chhaocharia and Grinstein (2006), is
related to the tightened disclosure regulation and governance standards in the second
half of our sample period. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act came in effect in July 2002 and, in
November 2003, both NYSE and NASDAQ introduced more stringent listing standards
for corporate governance (on the dimension of board structure). In our main empirical
tests, we control for year effects. As an alternative, we considered a dummy variable
that equals one for years 2003 to 2005, and zero otherwise. Effectively, we examined
potential structural changes post-SOX-regulation in comparison to pre-regulation. We
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did not find strong indication that the introduction of tighter governance standards
altered the relation between CEO power and their stock-based pay, or between CEO
power and firm performance.(34)
6.4.4. Model specification and instruments
As discussed in Section 4.2.5, we control for the endogeneity issue by estimating
a system of simultaneous equations with 2SLS models. We use the Hausman test to
compare the 2SLS estimates with those from simple OLS models. Our test results are
mixed: the 2SLS models are distinctly more efficient than the OLS models only half the
time. However, given that endogeneity has been widely accepted in the literature, we
still argue that the 2SLS models should be more robust than the OLS models. Three of
our instrumental variables are based on Bhagat and Bolton (2008), and the first-stage
F-statistics confirm that all these instruments are sufficiently strong.(35)
6.4.5. Non-linear risk measure
In our analysis, we have measured a firm’s total risk by the standard deviation of
stock returns over the previous 60 months, and used this as a firm-level control. This
is consistent with existing empirical studies. To test whether our results are sensitive
to non-linear risk measures, we also considered the logarithmic transformation of total
risk.(36) This change has little impact on our main results, although the new risk measure
is insignificant in most regression models.
7. Conclusion
This paper has studied theoretically and empirically the relation among CEO power,
CEO compensation and firm performance. Our theoretical model is focused on one
aspect of CEO power, namely, the power to affect one’s own pay. Narrowing down the
scope of CEO power in this way is to put in clearer perspectives some of the recent
criticisms against CEO compensation and to critically examine the rent extraction view
of CEO compensation put forward by the managerial power theory.
(34) Our main results are somewhat changed from pre-regulation to post-regulation. However, we do
not detect any general trend regarding whether CEO power has become more significantly associated
with CEO pay or firm performance.
(35) We follow Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and compare the first-stage F-statistics to the critical value
9.53 of Stock and Yogo (2004). All our F-statistics are much larger than this critical value.
(36) We thank Ron Masulis for his comments on this issue.
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The main theoretical results from this paper are that, although CEO power unam-
biguously leads to higher total pay for the CEO, it is the structure of the compensation
contract that matters for firm performance, and that there needs to be a clear dis-
tinction between gross and net firm performance. Specifically the power-performance
relation depends crucially on the channels - salary or stock-based pay in our model -
through which the CEO can extract rent. Our first conclusion is that, when there is no
constraint on the CEO’s salary, both the size of the CEO’s stock-based compensation
and the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO pay are independent of CEO power. Power
is efficiency-neutral in this case, only resulting in redistribution of rent from shareholders
to the CEO. Because of rent extraction by the CEO, however, firm performance net of
CEO pay would be worse in firms where the CEO has more power. Our second conclusion
is that, when the CEO’s salary has a binding cap, the CEO uses stock-based compensa-
tion as an additional channel for rent extraction. As a result, more CEO power leads to
larger stock-based pay for the CEO and higher pay-performance sensitivity. While such
over-incentivization leads to better firm performance gross of CEO pay, firm performance
net of CEO pay is worse if the CEO has more power.
Our theoretical predictions on the relation between CEO power and CEO pay, and
the relation between CEO power and pay-performance sensitivity of CEO’s stock-base
compensation are largely supported by our empirical findings for diverse measures of
CEO power. However the predicted relation between CEO power and firm performance
has mixed support: for some measures of CEO power and firm performance, more CEO
power is shown to be detrimental to outside shareholders; for other measures, more CEO
power is shown to improve return to outside shareholders. This suggests that, while the
managerial power theory has clear relevance in explaining the relation between power
and pay, the scope of power needs to be broadened to have better understanding of how
CEO power affects firm performance.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3: We first show βc = β¯. Suppose βc < β¯. There are two cases to
consider depending on the owner’s (IR). First, suppose V = V¯ and βc < β¯. Then the
non-binding salary constraint and the binding (IR) imply that the solution to (9) must
be equal to the solution to (6), the manager’s optimal contracting problem without the
salary constraint. But this is not possible since βp > β¯ > βc. Suppose next V > V¯ and
βc < β¯. Then the manager can increase his expected utility by increasing βc without
violating the owner’s (IR). This implies that the solution to (9) cannot have V > V¯ and
βc < β¯. Combining these two, we conclude that βc = β¯.
Next we show that the owner’s (IR) must be binding at the solution to (9). Using
βc = β¯, we can rewrite (9) as
Maximizea U(a, β¯, e(a)) subject to V (a, β¯, e(a)) ≥ V¯ . (A1)
with the Lagrangian L(a, λ) = U(a, β¯, e(a)) + λ[V (a, β¯, e(a)) − V¯ ] where λ ≥ 0. The
first-order conditions for the Lagrangian are
∂L
∂a
= U1 + U3e′(a) + λ[V1 + V3e′(a)] = U1 + λ[V1 + V3e′(a)] = 0, (A2)
∂L
∂λ
= V − V¯ ≥ 0 and λ(V − V¯ ) = 0 (A3)
where the subscripts in (A2) denote partial derivatives with respect to the relevant
arguments, and the second equality in (A2) follows from the manager’s (IC). Suppose
V > V¯ . Then from (A3), we must have λ = 0, which implies that (A2) is reduced to
∂L
∂a = U1 = 0. This is not possible since U1 > 0 by Assumption 1. Therefore we must
have V = V¯ . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: From Lemma 3, we have V (αc, β¯, ec) = V (αc, 0, ec) − β¯ =
V¯ or V (αc, 0, ec) = V¯ + β¯. Without the salary constraint, we have V (αp, βp, ep) =
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V (αp, 0, ep) − βp = V¯ or V (αp, 0, ep) = V¯ + βp. Since βp > β¯, we have V (αp, 0, ep) >
V (αc, 0, ec). To show αc ≥ αp, it is then sufficient to show that V (α, 0, e(α)) is a
nonincreasing function of α in the neighborhood of αp and αc. Then we have αc ≥ αp
since V (α, 0, e(α)) is concave in α, hence monotonic on the interval [αp, αc].
Consider now the manager’s optimal contracting problem (A1) in the proof of
Lemma 3 where β¯ is replaced by any β. Then the first-order condition (A2) can be
written as
dV (αc, β, e(αc))
dα
= V1((αc, β, e(αc)) + V3(αc, β, e(αc))e′(αc)
= −U1(αc, β, e(αc))
λ
≤ 0
(A4)
for all β since U1 > 0 by Assumption 1 and λ ≥ 0. Since dV (α,0,e(α))dα = dV (α,β,e(α))dα for
all β, (A4) shows that V (α, 0, e(α)) is a nonincreasing function of α in the neighborhood
of αc. Next consider the manager’s optimal contracting problem without the salary
constraint, which is given in (6). Since the owner’s (IR) is binding, the manager’s
objective function can be written as U(a, b, e(a)) = U(a, 0, e(a))+V (a, 0, e(a))−V¯ . Since
αp maximizes U(a, b, e(a)), we have U1+U3e′(αp)+V1+V3e′(αp) = U1+V1+V3e′(αp) = 0
where all derivatives are evaluated at αp. This leads to V1+V3e′(αp) = −U1 < 0, proving
that V (α, 0, e(α)) is a nonincreasing function of α in the neighborhood of αp.
Therefore αc ≥ αp. Since e(·) is an increasing function of α, it follows that ec =
e(αc) ≥ ea = e(αa). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Differentiating V (γ) = V (αγ , βγ , e(αγ)) = V (αγ , 0, e(αγ)) − βγ
with respect to γ leads to
dV (γ)
dγ
=
(
dV (αγ , 0, e(αγ))
dαγ
)
dαγ
dγ
− dβγ
dγ
. (A5)
Following the similar step as in the proof of Proposition 4, it is easy to show that
V (α, 0, e(α)) is a nonincreasing function of α in the neighborhood of αa. Since αγ ∈
[αa, αc] and V (α, 0, e(α)) is also nonincreasing in the neighborhood of αc, V (α, 0, e(α))
is monotonic on the interval [αa, αc] due to concavity. Since both
dαγ
dγ and
dβγ
dγ are
nonnegative, we must have dV (γ)dγ ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
43
 44
Appendix B: Variable Definition 
 
 
Variables Definition
Compensation Variables
Salary Dollar value ('000) of of salary
Stock-based pay Dollar value ('000) of stock-based pay, including restricted stock and stock options granted during the 
Total pay Dollar value ('000) of total compensation
Salary % Percentage of total pay that is fixed salary
Stock % Percentage of total pay that is stock-based
Performance Variables: Gross
GAVQ Gross average Q ratio: market value of assets over total assets
GROA Gross return on assets: EBITDA over total assets for firms that did not report expenses related to stock-
based compensation; EBITDA + XINTOPT (Compustat variable for implied expenses of stock-based 
compensation) over total assets for firms that reported expenses related to stock-based compensation
Performance Variables: Net
NTSR Net total shareholder return, change in market value of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year 
plus dividend paid, divided by market value of shares at the beginning of the year
CEO power determinants: Board of Directors
Board size Number of directors on the board
Duality Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm's CEO is also the board's chairperson, 0 otherwise
Exec. on Comp. Committee Percentage of executive directors on the board's compensation committee
Board independence Proportion of board directors who are independent
Busy directors Proportion of board directors with less than 75% attendance record
Power_BOD First principal component factor based on five indicator variables constructed from the above five 
Power_BOD2 Sum of the five indicator variables, divided by 5
CEO power determinants: Ownership Concentration
CEO ownership CEO's percentage share ownership
CEO voting CEO's percentage voting power
Director ownership Non-executive director's percentage share ownership
Institutional ownership Percentage share ownership of firm's institutional investors
Power_OWN First principal component factor based on three indicator variables constructed from the above four 
Power_OWN2 Sum of the three indicator variables, divided by 3
CEO power determinants: Shareholder rights
Power_GIM Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) governance index score, divided by 18
Power_BCF Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index score, divided by 6
Instruments 
IV for CEO power Percentage of directors who are currently active CEOs
IV for firm performance Ratio of stock repurchase to total assets
IV for CEO ownership Ratio of CEO tenure to CEO age
IV for CEO stock-based pay CEO age
Firm-level control variables
Size Logarithm of total sales
Size (alternative) Logarithm of total assets
Leverage Total debt over total assets 
Risk Standard deviation of stock prices over the previous 60 months
Growth Sales growth rate over the past 3 years
Growth (alternative) Market-to-book equity ratio to proxy for growth opportunity
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Figure 1: Distribution of CEO Salary for S&P500 Firms 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – CEO Compensation 
 
The sample includes S&P1500 firms over the period of 2001-2005. CEO compensation data are 
extracted from the ExecuComp database. Total compensation includes salary, bonus, stock-based 
compensation including restricted stock and options granted, long-term incentive payments, and other 
compensation payout not separately reported anywhere else. In panel B, the sample is divided into two 
groups, those with CEO salary above $1 million (unconstrained group) and those with CEO salary 
below $1 million (constrained group). 
 
Panel A: CEO compensation, all firms
Salary Stock
Year INDEX OBS Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
2001 S&P1500 885 674 600 4,659 1,383 6,549 2,930 20% 47%
2002 S&P1500 906 690 631 3,394 1,294 5,289 2,915 22% 44%
2003 S&P1500 938 720 667 2,727 1,168 4,848 2,873 23% 41%
2004 S&P1500 970 740 690 3,173 1,502 5,592 3,427 20% 44%
2005 S&P1500 1028 762 700 3,117 1,547 5,762 3,600 19% 43%
Panel B: CEO compensation, by Group and by S&P Index
Salary Stock
Year INDEX OBS Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
2001 SM 2 1,046 1,046 1,095 1,095 3,928 3,928 27% 28%
2002 SM 4 1,122 1,119 1,557 691 3,551 3,141 36% 22%
2003 SM 5 1,123 1,100 1,225 1,116 3,374 3,037 36% 37%
2004 SM 7 1,227 1,140 1,496 678 3,901 2,803 41% 24%
2005 SM 9 1,139 1,055 2,695 2,368 5,421 5,366 20% 44%
Overall 27 1,131 1,092 1,614 1,190 4,035 3,655 32% 31%
2001 MD 10 1,521 1,186 2,818 2,709 14,740 6,497 18% 42%
2002 MD 14 1,412 1,300 4,312 2,120 11,719 6,686 19% 32%
2003 MD 17 1,372 1,237 3,398 2,241 10,594 7,976 16% 28%
2004 MD 18 1,374 1,250 4,033 2,887 10,683 7,580 16% 38%
2005 MD 22 1,503 1,165 5,236 3,896 11,893 9,705 12% 40%
Overall 81 1,436 1,228 3,959 2,771 11,926 7,689 16% 36%
2001 SP 92 1,385 1,238 5,805 5,112 15,820 11,141 11% 46%
2002 SP 97 1,358 1,250 8,459 6,162 13,290 9,949 13% 62%
2003 SP 106 1,391 1,240 5,923 5,282 11,301 9,847 13% 54%
2004 SP 131 1,366 1,224 6,579 5,691 11,805 10,438 12% 55%
2005 SP 138 1,417 1,249 6,624 4,991 12,906 10,092 12% 49%
Overall 564 1,383 1,240 6,678 5,448 13,024 10,293 12% 53%
Salary Stock
Year INDEX OBS Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
2001 SM 303 454 438 788 764 2,002 1,375 32% 56%
2002 SM 314 473 455 919 496 1,834 1,357 34% 37%
2003 SM 336 491 467 984 504 1,913 1,445 32% 35%
2004 SM 357 513 492 1,158 692 2,352 1,819 27% 38%
2005 SM 390 530 505 1,214 635 2,601 1,833 28% 35%
Overall 1700 492 472 1,012 618 2,141 1,566 30% 40%
2001 MD 235 584 575 2,616 1,257 3,928 2,502 23% 50%
2002 MD 236 599 600 2,151 1,238 3,671 2,892 21% 43%
2003 MD 239 640 654 1,571 1,063 3,115 2,522 26% 42%
2004 MD 245 647 651 2,012 1,467 3,872 3,256 20% 45%
2005 MD 260 664 676 2,139 1,454 4,075 3,441 20% 42%
Overall 1215 627 631 2,098 1,296 3,732 2,923 22% 44%
2001 SP 243 728 785 4,591 3,042 10,826 5,821 13% 52%
2002 SP 241 744 814 5,602 3,256 7,740 5,274 15% 62%
2003 SP 235 772 849 4,937 2,613 7,493 5,294 16% 49%
2004 SP 212 777 855 5,787 3,164 8,751 5,851 15% 54%
2005 SP 209 790 879 5,362 3,011 8,396 5,560 16% 54%
Overall 1140 762 836 5,256 3,017 8,641 5,560 15% 54%
Constrained group
Total Pay
Salary Stock-based Pay Total Pay
Unconstrained group
% of Total Pay
Salary Stock-based Pay Total Pay
% of Total Pay
% of Total Pay
Salary Stock-based Pay
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Table 2: Measures of CEO Power 
 
CEO power is measured in terms of board composition (Power_BOD and Power_BOD2), ownership concentration (Power_OWN and Power_OWN2), and shareholder rights 
(Power_BCF and Power_GIM). All data are sourced from Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC), Board Analyst, and ExecuComp databases. The values of all 
three CEO power measures are scaled to range between 0 and 1, with 0 representing the least powerful CEO and 1, the most powerful CEO. The detailed definition of all the 
individual variables is in Appendix B. 
 
 
Panel A: CEO power - board of directors
Sub-sample INDEX OBS Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Constrained SM 1700 8.017 1.81 0.651 0.18 0.776 0.42 0.084 0.27 0.492 0.50
Unconstrained SM 27 8.333 1.65 0.603 0.17 0.852 0.22 0.020 0.16 0.429 0.51
t-test for mean difference  -0.316 -0.83 0.049 1.25 -0.077 -1.94 0.064 1.90 0.063 0.58
Constrained MD 1215 8.820 2.03 0.662 0.18 0.797 0.40 0.126 0.33 0.593 0.49
Unconstrained MD 81 9.690 2.35 0.625 0.18 0.730 0.45 0.064 0.25 0.565 0.50
t-test for mean difference   -0.870 -2.85 0.037 1.51 0.066 1.15 0.062 1.91 0.029 0.45
Constrained SP 1140 9.819 2.34 0.672 0.19 0.782 0.41 0.140 0.35 0.622 0.49
Unconstrained SP 564 11.282 2.09 0.720 0.17 0.810 0.39 0.126 0.33 0.775 0.42
t-test for mean difference   -1.463 -11.89 -0.048 -4.88 -0.028 -1.28 0.014 0.78 -0.153 6.36
DualityBusy DirectorsBoard Size Board 
Independence
Exec. on Comp. 
Committee
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Table 2: Measures of CEO Power (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: CEO Power - ownership concentration & governance scores
Sub-sample INDEX OBS Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Constrained SM 1700 2.914 6.97 4.580 10.31 9.814 13.97 60.880 26.09
Unconstrained SM 27 7.099 10.14 8.413 10.09 7.469 9.66 59.010 33.33
t-test for mean difference   -4.185 -2.14 -3.833 -1.92 2.345 0.87 1.870 0.29
Constrained MD 1215 2.778 6.83 4.183 10.09 9.306 13.34 61.326 27.42
Unconstrained MD 81 4.758 9.22 8.322 17.50 13.149 19.58 59.892 28.59
t-test for mean difference   -1.980 -1.90 -4.139 -2.10 -3.843 -1.74 1.434 0.39
Constrained SP 1140 1.026 3.58 1.814 5.93 8.436 13.19 60.190 26.84
Unconstrained SP 564 0.872 4.38 1.378 5.81 5.937 10.89 62.102 25.62
t-test for mean difference   0.154 0.78 0.436 1.39 2.499 3.75 -1.912 -1.35
Sub-sample INDEX OBS Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Constrained SM 1700 0.278 0.24 0.392 0.32 0.419 0.21 0.502 0.14
Unconstrained SM 27 0.203 0.24 0.352 0.28 0.435 0.23 0.484 0.14
t-test for mean difference   0.075 1.60 0.040 0.66 -0.016 -0.36 0.018 0.59
Constrained MD 1215 0.354 0.27 0.382 0.30 0.423 0.19 0.519 0.14
Unconstrained MD 81 0.308 0.25 0.362 0.32 0.464 0.15 0.544 0.14
t-test for mean difference   0.046 1.50 0.020 0.55 -0.041 -1.65 -0.025 -1.35
Constrained SP 1140 0.425 0.28 0.288 0.27 0.403 0.22 0.533 0.14
Unconstrained SP 564 0.525 0.27 0.242 0.26 0.388 0.22 0.557 0.13
t-test for mean difference   -0.100 -6.95 0.046 3.40 0.015 1.24 -0.024 -3.30
Sub-sample INDEX OBS Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Mean Stdev //  
t-value
Constrained SM 1700 0.239 0.20 0.388 0.31
Unconstrained SM 27 0.206 0.19 0.358 0.29
t-test for mean difference   0.033 0.67 0.030 0.50
Constrained MD 1215 0.300 0.22 0.390 0.30
Unconstrained MD 81 0.264 0.22 0.354 0.30
t-test for mean difference   0.036 1.41 0.036 1.05
Constrained SP 1140 0.360 0.23 0.308 0.27
Unconstrained SP 564 0.432 0.22 0.264 0.27
t-test for mean difference   -0.071 -6.06 0.044 3.17
Power_BOD
Institutional 
ownership
Power_OWN
CEO voting rights Director 
ownership
Power_BCF
Power_BOD2 Power_OWN2
Power_GIM
CEO ownership
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Table 3: Firm Performance Measures and Control Variables 
 
Gross firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q (GAVQ) and return on assets (GROA) while net performance is measured by total shareholder return (NTSR).  Control 
variables are firm size measured as logarithm of total sales or assets, leverage, growth measured as the sales growth rate over the past 3 years, growth opportunity measured 
as market-to-book-ratio of equity, and risk measured as the standard deviation of stock returns over the previous 60 months. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Firm performance measures
Sub-sample INDEX OBS Mean // 
diff.
Stdev  //     
t-value
Mean // diff. Stdev  //      
t-value
Mean // diff. Stdev  //   
t-value
Constrained SM 1700 7.278 10.63 2.030 2.26 16.608 40.50
Unconstrained SM 27 10.713 8.23 1.538 0.95 12.717 27.91
t-test for mean difference -3.435 -1.81 0.493 2.14 3.891 0.58
Constrained MD 1215 8.780 10.14 2.519 2.74 21.615 33.98
Unconstrained MD 81 9.459 9.98 2.817 3.22 15.712 35.08
t-test for mean difference -0.679 -0.56 -0.298 -0.61 5.903 -1.35
Constrained SP 1167 10.171 10.68 3.149 3.73 13.327 31.04
Unconstrained SP 581 10.937 9.67 2.238 2.87 9.318 23.79
t-test for mean difference -0.766 -0.72 0.912 4.74 4.009 2.63
GROA GAVQ NTSR
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Table 3: Firm Performance Measures and Control Variables (continued) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Firm-level control variables
Sub-sample INDEX OBS Mean // 
diff.
Stdev  //     
t-value
Mean // diff. Stdev  //      
t-value
Mean // diff. Stdev  //   
t-value
Mean // diff. Stdev  //  
t-value
Mean // 
diff.
Stdev  //  
t-value
Mean // 
diff.
Stdev  //      
t-value
Constrained SM 1700 6.379 1.00 6.217 1.03 37.929 28.30 42.440 19.88 9.990 16.90 8.145 29.64
Unconstrained SM 27 7.188 0.72 7.201 0.64 25.000 27.18 45.020 16.84 14.150 27.31 5.791 14.43
t-test for mean difference -0.809 -3.32 -0.984 -4.17 12.929 2.36 -2.580 -0.65 -4.160 -0.66 2.354 0.69
Constrained MD 1215 7.523 1.01 7.110 0.90 35.940 25.74 48.450 19.90 11.174 17.87 11.545 28.27
Unconstrained MD 81 8.226 0.73 7.989 0.77 25.950 22.67 60.978 13.16 13.411 13.92 11.742 33.58
t-test for mean difference -0.703 -5.50 -0.879 -7.73 9.990 3.81 -12.528 -5.01 -2.237 -0.99 -0.197 0.05
Constrained SP 1167 8.321 1.31 8.313 1.00 35.690 24.61 52.590 20.52 11.721 19.60 19.460 49.23
Unconstrained SP 581 9.995 1.02 9.539 1.05 27.399 18.05 61.499 16.34 9.387 14.98 23.780 64.07
t-test for mean difference -1.674 -22.11 -1.226 -22.40 8.291 7.11 -8.909 -9.52 2.334 2.45 -4.320 -1.35
Growth opportunitiesRisk Leverage Growth rateSize (Log_assets) Size (Log_sales)
 
 
 
Panel C: Pearson correlation coefficients
GROA GAVQ NTSR Power_BOD Power_OWN Power_BCF Power_GIM Size_s Risk Leverage Growth Opportunity
GROA 1.000 0.144 0.109 0.078 -0.024 -0.018 0.017 Size_s 1.000 -0.257 0.499 -0.003 0.087
GAVQ 1.000 0.131 0.040 -0.027 -0.033 -0.001 Risk 1.000 -0.177 -0.043 0.033
NTSR 1.000 -0.054 0.024 0.045 -0.002 Leverage 1.000 -0.127 0.034
Power_BOD 1.000 0.130 0.154 0.236 Growth 1.000 0.035
Power_OWN 1.000 0.038 -0.039 Opportunity 1.000
Power_BCF 1.000 0.745
Power_GIM 1.000  
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Table 4: Stock-based Compensation and CEO Power 
 
Regression results of Hypothesis 1, or equation (13), are reported, showing the potential impact of CEO power on the CEO’s stock-based compensation. The dependent 
variable is either the dollar value of CEO’s stock-based pay, or stock-based pay as a percentage of total compensation. In the 2-stage least squares (2SLS) models, CEO age is 
used as an instrument for CEO’s stock-based pay, and only the 2nd stage results are reported.  For the unconstrained group, the coefficient for Power is β1 in equation (18) 
and, for the constrained group, it is the sum of the coefficients for Power and Dmil*Power, or β1 + β2 in equation (13).  In Panels A and B, regression coefficients and 
respective p-values are reported. In Panel C, β1 and β1 + β2 and respective p-values are reported for Hypothesis 1: β1 = 0, β1 + β2 > 0. Coefficients significant at the 5% level 
are highlighted in bold. 
 
 
OLS (1) 2SLS (1) OLS (2) 2SLS (2) OLS (3) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (4) OLS (1) 2SLS (1) OLS (2) 2SLS (2) OLS (3) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (4)
Dmil -204.2 -337.4 -1971.5 -1882.9 -324.5 -516.9 879.7 1173.5 Dmil 3.954 5.884 3.477 3.565 5.338 5.577 6.958 6.436
0.86 0.71 0.20 0.21 0.79 0.57 0.66 0.61 0.28 0.08 0.84 0.08 0.54 0.13 0.35 0.38
Power_BOD -2188.8 -2008.2 Power_BOD 1.555 3.118
0.06 0.06 0.43 0.37
Power_BOD * Dmil 2239.8 2846.8 Power_BOD * Dmil 5.660 8.276
0.05 0.02 0.25 0.11
Power_OWN -2117.8 -3908.0 Power_OWN -8.593 -9.575
0.08 0.34 0.11 0.07
Power_OWN * Dmil 2962.0 1011.4 Power_OWN * Dmil 0.548 1.818
0.07 0.31 0.92 0.42
Power_BCF -2058.0 -2932.5 Power_BCF -4.701 -6.369
0.20 0.05 0.22 0.10
Power_BCF * Dmil 1283.0 1334.8 Power_BCF * Dmil 5.444 8.558
0.80 0.39 0.13 0.04
Power_GIM -5405.3 -5381.4 Power_GIM -10.379 -13.739
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00
Power_GIM * Dmil 3866.2 4295.5 Power_GIM * Dmil 5.540 10.393
0.25 0.23 0.53 0.22
Lag (CEO ownership) -170.0 -169.7 -131.1 -130.7 -184.4 -183.0 -194.1 -196.2 Lag (CEO ownership) -0.787 -1.080 -0.809 -1.081 -0.806 -1.129 -0.868 -1.144
0.00 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm Size 307.6 435.7 241.2 392.8 522.3 275.9 224.0 321.7 Firm Size -0.168 -1.440 -1.789 -1.702 -0.102 -0.661 -0.125 -0.728
0.20 0.06 0.30 0.10 0.11 0.25 0.31 0.18 0.85 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.91 0.70 0.83 0.53
Firm Risk 26.8 28.6 28.0 31.9 27.2 28.7 25.2 26.8 Firm Risk 0.087 0.115 0.094 0.145 0.098 0.111 0.092 0.099
0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Firm Growth 86.0 82.0 83.2 85.6 98.6 103.0 94.7 96.6 Firm Growth 0.141 0.124 0.143 0.134 0.151 0.123 0.136 0.110
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.114 0.113 0.103 0.112 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.110 R-squared 0.105 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.105 0.104
Sample size Sample size
P_BOD P_BOD P_OWN P_OWN P_BCF P_BCF P_GIM P_GIM P_BOD P_BOD P_OWN P_OWN P_BCF P_BCF P_GIM P_GIM
Unconstrained (β1) -2188.8 -2008.2 -2117.8 -3908.0 -2058.0 -2932.5 -5405.3 -5381.4 Unconstrained (β1) 1.555 3.118 -8.593 -9.575 -4.701 -6.369 -10.379 -13.739
p-value for 2-tailed test 0.061 0.062 0.077 0.340 0.203 0.054 0.010 0.020 p-value for 2-tailed test 0.430 0.369 0.106 0.072 0.222 0.104 0.033 0.001
Constrained (β1+β2) 51.0 838.6 844.2 -2896.7 -775.0 -1597.7 -1539.1 -1085.9 Constrained (β1+β2) 7.215 11.394 -8.045 -7.757 0.743 2.189 -4.839 -3.346
p-value for 1-tailed test 0.487 0.194 0.308 0.441 0.231 0.195 0.352 0.360 p-value for 1-tailed test 0.108 0.053 0.119 0.157 0.306 0.324 0.324 0.338
Panel C: Coefficient estimate for power for constrained and unconstrained groups
Panel A: Dollar value of CEO stock-based pay Panel B: Stock-based pay as % of total pay
1280 1280 1223 1223 1278 1278 1222 1222
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Table 5: Pay-performance Sensitivity of Stock-based Compensation 
 
 
Regression results of Hypothesis 2, or equation (14), are reported, showing the relation between CEO 
power and the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s stock-based compensation.   The dependent 
variable is the change in the dollar value of stock-based compensation. In equation (14), the pay-
performance sensitivity is δ0 + δ1 for the unconstrained group and δ0 + δ1 + δ2 for the constrained group.  
The coefficient for Power is δ1 for the unconstrained group and, for the constrained group, it is the sum 
of the coefficients for Power and Dmil*Power, or δ1 + δ2.  In Panel A, regression coefficients and 
associated p-values are reported. In Panel B, δ1 and δ1 + δ2 and respective p-values are reported for 
Hypothesis 2: δ1 = 0, δ1 + δ2 > 0. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold. 
 
 
Overall Separate OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 
$ Change in Mkt value 0.082 0.004 0.193 0.084 -0.035 -0.085
0.01 0.92 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.49
Dmil * $ Change in Mkt value 0.201
0.00
Power_BOD * $ Change in Mkt value 0.267
0.12
Dmil * Power_BOD * $ Change in Mkt value 0.089
0.49
Power_OWN * $ Change in Mkt value -0.244
0.31
Dmil * Power_OWN * $ Change in Mkt value 0.675
0.03
Power_BCF * $ Change in Mkt value 0.239
0.22
Dmil * Power_BCF * $ Change in Mkt value 0.823
0.01
Power_GIM * $ Change in Mkt value 0.207
0.43
Dmil * Power_GIM * $ Change in Mkt value 0.089
0.48
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.100
Sample size 1282 1282 1278 1278
                             Panel B: Coefficient estimates for power for the constrained and unconstrained groups
P_BOD P_OWN P_BCF P_GIM
Unconstrained (δ1) 0.267 -0.244 0.239 0.207
p-value for 2-tailed test 0.117 0.314 0.217 0.431
Constrained (δ1 + δ2) 0.356 0.431 1.062 0.296
p-value for 1-tailed test 0.027 0.030 0.000 0.117
Panel A: Dependent variable - dollar change in the CEO's stock-based pay
1353
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Table 6: Firm Performance and CEO Power 
 
Regression results of Hypotheses 3 and 4, or equations (15), are reported, showing the potential impact 
of CEO power on firm performance.  Dependent variables are gross or net performance measures 
including Tobin’s Q ratio (GAVQ), accounting rate of return (GROA), and net total shareholder return 
(NTSR). Main independent variables are Dmil, an indicator that equals 1 for firms in the constrained 
group, and 0 otherwise; four measures of CEO power; and the interaction terms of Dmil and the 
measures of CEO power. In the 2SLS models, the ratio of stock repurchase to total assets is used as an 
instrument for firm performance and only the 2nd stage results are reported.  For the unconstrained 
group, the coefficient relevant for Hypotheses 3 and 4 is that for Power and, for the constrained group, 
it is the sum of the coefficients for Power and Power*Dmil. Panel C reports these coefficients and their 
respective p-values. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold. 
 
 
 
 
OLS (1) 2SLS (1) OLS (2) 2SLS (2) OLS (3) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (4)
Dmil 0.731 0.785 0.247 0.199 -0.103 -0.154 -0.697 -0.512
0.04 0.02 0.33 0.40 0.79 0.67 0.36 0.47
Power_BOD -0.325 -0.401
0.33 0.21
Power_BOD * Dmil 1.174 1.195
0.02 0.05
Power_OWN 0.378 0.478
0.24 0.13
Power_OWN * Dmil 0.187 0.028
0.74 0.91
Power_BCF 0.332 0.613
0.47 0.15
Power_BCF * Dmil -0.168 -0.499
0.83 0.52
Power_GIM 0.735 0.530
0.30 0.42
Power_GIM * Dmil -0.310 -0.710
0.83 0.70
CEO Ownership -0.019 -0.007 -0.019 -0.008 -0.019 -0.008 -0.018 -0.009
0.38 0.73 0.37 0.71 0.40 0.69 0.44 0.70
Firm Size -0.115 -0.116 -0.074 -0.086 -0.073 -0.060 -0.084 -0.077
0.20 0.13 0.42 0.27 0.44 0.46 0.37 0.33
Firm Risk 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007
0.10 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.06
Firm Growth 0.111 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.113 0.112 0.113 0.112
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm Leverage -0.045 -0.045 -0.047 -0.046 -0.045 -0.045 -0.046 -0.044
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.446 0.428 0.436 0.428 0.461 0.440 0.463 0.440
Sample size
         Panel B: Coefficient estimates for Power for the constrained and unconstrained groups
P_BOD P_BOD P_OWN P_OWN P_BCF P_BCF P_GIM P_GIM
Unconstrained -0.325 -0.401 0.378 0.478 0.332 0.613 0.735 0.530
p-value for 2-tailed test 0.328 0.210 0.240 0.126 0.470 0.146 0.298 0.422
Constrained 0.849 0.794 0.565 0.506 0.164 0.114 0.425 -0.180
p-value for 1-tailed test 0.022 0.024 0.116 0.133 0.404 0.441 0.150 0.389
1303 1303
Panel A: Dependent variable: GAVQ
1400 1400
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Table 6: Firm Performance and CEO Power (continued) 
 
 
OLS (1) 2SLS (1) OLS (2) 2SLS (2) OLS (3) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (4)
Dmil 1.086 1.125 1.236 -0.238 -0.641 -0.926 -1.372 -2.044
0.24 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.54 0.38 0.50 0.13
Power_BOD -0.065 -2.063
0.94 0.10
Power_BOD * Dmil 1.749 2.872
0.26 0.07
Power_OWN -0.220 -0.850
0.80 0.53
Power_OWN * Dmil 3.643 2.659
0.02 0.05
Power_BCF -0.963 -1.723
0.12 0.07
Power_BCF * Dmil 1.385 0.285
0.51 0.90
Power_GIM 2.972 2.133
0.12 0.71
Power_GIM * Dmil -2.560 -1.759
0.15 0.37
CEO Ownership 0.068 0.101 0.091 0.119 0.073 0.093 0.089 0.109
0.21 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.07
Firm Size -0.090 -0.813 -0.715 0.715 -0.139 -0.766 -0.080 -0.612
0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.75 0.17
Firm Risk -0.077 -0.091 -0.077 -0.090 -0.078 -0.081 -0.075 -0.088
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
Firm Growth 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.00
Firm Leverage -0.058 -0.058 -0.057 -0.058 -0.067 -0.062 -0.074 -0.068
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.124 0.130 0.127 0.130 0.131 0.134 0.131 0.134
Sample size
        Panel B: Coefficient estimates for Power for the constrained and unconstrained groups
P_BOD P_BOD P_OWN P_OWN P_BCF P_BCF P_GIM P_GIM
Unconstrained -0.065 -2.063 -0.220 -0.850 -0.963 -1.723 2.972 2.133
p-value for 2-tailed test 0.942 0.102 0.800 0.533 0.119 0.074 0.122 0.714
Constrained 1.683 0.809 3.423 1.809 0.422 -1.438 0.412 0.374
p-value for 1-tailed test 0.167 0.371 0.064 0.211 0.390 0.125 0.447 0.449
13931501 1393
Panel A: Dependent variable: GROA
1501
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Table 6: Firm Performance and CEO Power (continued) 
 
 
 
OLS (1) 2SLS (1) OLS (2) 2SLS (2) OLS (3) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (4)
Dmil 2.391 3.900 0.511 2.980 3.540 4.986 10.469 11.668
0.47 0.23 0.83 0.19 0.34 0.15 0.15 0.09
Power_BOD -3.745 -6.054
0.34 0.07
Power_BOD * Dmil 2.670 4.102
0.61 0.30
Power_OWN 3.956 4.614
0.20 0.13
Power_OWN * Dmil -1.144 0.844
0.83 0.88
Power_BCF 7.360 9.732
0.09 0.02
Power_BCF * Dmil 2.883 2.721
0.46 0.47
Power_GIM -2.113 -5.494
0.76 0.40
Power_GIM * Dmil 12.233 16.161
0.26 0.16
CEO_ownership 0.154 0.207 0.167 0.220 0.181 0.262 0.142 0.215
0.46 0.31 0.42 0.28 0.40 0.22 0.51 0.31
Firm Size -2.244 -1.368 -2.116 -1.104 -1.569 -0.607 -1.852 -0.985
0.01 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.43 0.04 0.20
Firm Risk -0.050 -0.034 -0.050 0.036 -0.033 0.014 -0.037 -0.024
0.15 0.32 0.15 0.29 0.36 0.68 0.30 0.51
Firm Growth 0.088 0.079 0.088 0.080 0.080 0.074 0.079 0.070
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm Leverage 0.011 0.048 -0.002 0.024 0.013 0.007 0.001 0.036
0.84 0.23 0.96 0.56 0.78 0.88 0.89 0.40
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.105 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.107 0.107 0.104 0.102
Sample size
         Panel B: Coefficient estimates for Power for the constrained and unconstrained groups
P_BOD P_BOD P_OWN P_OWN P_BCF P_BCF P_GIM P_GIM
Unconstrained -3.745 -6.054 3.956 4.614 7.360 9.732 -2.113 -5.494
p-value for 2-tailed test 0.338 0.065 0.200 0.130 0.092 0.020 0.756 0.397
Constrained -1.075 -1.952 2.811 5.458 10.243 12.453 10.120 10.667
p-value for 1-tailed test 0.408 0.333 0.267 0.146 0.112 0.048 0.218 0.166
                         Panel A: Dependent variable: NTSR
1493 139513951493
 
